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Foreword
This Financial Stability Report (FSR), the 5
th in the series, is being released against a backdrop of worrisome 
global and domestic macroeconomic developments. Sovereign default concerns and the need for substantial 
bank recapitalisation in the Eurozone have escalated fears of contagion and recession. Even as governments 
respond by reducing public expenditure, widespread dissent against austerity and other harsh measures in times 
of rising unemployment have led to the fall of several incumbents. Globally, decision making in democracies has 
become hostage to political polarisation. Confi dence in the fi nancial system is low and investors seem to have 
turned risk averse.
On the domestic front, slowing growth, elevated infl ation and large fi scal and current account defi cits are 
serious concerns. The already high fi scal defi cit leaves little room for the Government to stimulate the economy. 
The current account defi cit is being increasingly fi nanced by debt fl ows, threatening long-term sustainability.
On the positive side, the recent decline in petroleum prices, if sustained, can provide some relief. The projected 
normal monsoon and the inherent resilience of the Indian economy could provide the needed momentum to growth, 
provided appropriate policy actions are initiated to contain the defi cits and improve the investment climate. Further, 
despite some negative indicators, particularly on asset quality, the Indian fi nancial sector has remained sound and 
resilient. Banks continue to be well capitalised with leverage at healthy levels.
Through these half-yearly FSRs, the Reserve Bank hopes to share the results of its macro prudential surveillance 
with the market, to encourage debate, to create awareness of the vulnerabilities in the system and even to initiate 
prompt corrective action. As in the case of the previous FSRs, this issue of the Report refl ects the collective assessment 
of the Sub Committee of the Financial Stability and Development Council (FSDC) on potential risks to fi nancial stability.
The dictum for central bankers used to be akin to how mothers, across cultures and across time, have 
admonished their children: ‘If you can’t say anything nice, don’t say it at all’. That dictum is no longer valid. Today 
central banks and regulators have to bear the responsibility of striking the right balance between presenting a candid 
and accurate picture and not causing unnecessary alarm. Robert Shiller, in an interview published in Central Banking 
Journal regarding his latest book on ‘Central Banks and their Role in a Good Society’, says “… This gets back to a 
basic issue about central bank policy that they have a sense that they are criticised whenever they rock the boat; 
whenever they say something that alarms markets. There might be a bias in central bank thinking towards short 
run stability when they should be making provocative statements from time to time…”
The endeavour of our FSRs has been to explain the known knowns and indicate the known unknowns. Making 
people aware of the problem goes a long way in mitigating it. Timing of an alert or a warning is, of course, crucial. 
As the French novelist, Marguerite Yourcenar, commented “being right too early is being wrong”.
Dr. D. Subbarao
June 28, 2012
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Overview
The financial system of the country remains robust, though risks to stability have increased since the publication 
of the last Financial Stability Report (FSR) in December 2011. The combined effect of the dismal global 
macroeconomic situation and the muted economic performance on the domestic front has caused marginal 
increase in risks to stability. The financial sector stakeholders, however, continued to repose confidence in the 
stability of the domestic financial system, as revealed by the findings of Reserve Bank’s second Systemic Risk 
Survey, though there has been some reduction in the level of confidence. Threats to stability are posed by the 
global sovereign debt problem and risk aversion, domestic fiscal position, widening current account deficit and 
structural aspects of food inflation. Falling international crude oil prices and a normal monsoon could, however, 
be positives for the domestic economy, going forward.  The foreign exchange and equity markets witnessed high 
levels of volatility while investor confidence and sentiments ran low. Indian banks’ soundness indicators remained 
robust, although the pressures on asset quality persisted. Given a decelerating deposit growth, banks’ reliance 
on borrowed funds, especially short term funds increased. The country’s financial market infrastructure 
functioned without disruption. But, potential vulnerabilities such as settlement lags in the Real Time Gross 
Settlement (RTGS) System and large uncollateralised intra-day exposures assumed by the Clearing Corporation 
of India Limited (CCIL) on its designated settlement banks need to be addressed. The results of a series of 
stress tests to study the impact of adverse macro-financial shocks showed that the banking system remained 
resilient even under extreme stress scenarios.
The financial system remains robust though risks to 
financial stability have worsened
1. Risks to financial stability have worsened since 
December 2011, primarily due to global risks and 
domestic macroeconomic conditions. Risks to domestic 
growth are accentuated by fiscal and external sector 
imbalances. Financial markets, particularly the foreign 
exchange market, continue to correct downwards and 
experience heightened volatility. The recent decline in 
international crude oil prices, if sustained, could provide 
relief. A normal monsoon could also alleviate pressures 
on the growth front and provide impetus towards 
reviving the domestic economy, given its inherent 
strength. Banks are well capitalised, though trends in 
asset quality and their ability to withstand sustained 
liquidity pressures pose some concerns. The overall 
stability of the system remained robust as indicated by 
the trends in the Financial Stability Map (Chart 1)1.
1  The composite financial stability map, which attempts to capture the movements in the risks on the three major dimensions of the 
Indian financial system – macroeconomy, financial markets and banking sector. Detailed methodology is in the Annex.
2  Position of the Financial Markets Stability Indicator is as in May 2012
Chart 1: Financial Stability Map
Note: Risks increase with the distance from the centre2
Source: RBI staff calculations
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Survey respondents express concerns about global 
risks and twin deficits; remain confident about 
stability
2. The respondents of Reserve Bank’s second 
Systemic Risk Survey, conducted in April 2012, expressed 
their concern about the evolving global risks as well as 
a host of domestic factors including the current account 
defi cit, fi scal defi cit, asset quality of banks and potential 
funding risks. However, the participants remained 
relatively sanguine about the stability of the domestic 
financial system, despite some fall in the level of 
confi dence since the previous Survey, conducted in 
October 2011.
Global environment
Global macroeconomic risks have deteriorated
3. Deepening crisis in the Euro area and continued 
global slowdown contributed significantly to the 
deterioration in global risks. The downside risks to the 
global macroeconomic environment are expected to 
intensify further in the coming months, owing to the 
political uncertainty in the Euro area, the persistence of 
global imbalances, fi scal stress and sluggish growth 
prospects. Debt and gross fi nancing needs continue to 
be high in several Advanced Economies (AEs), even as 
sovereign yields are rising for some Euro area countries.
The contagion from Euro area spreads to other 
advanced and emerging economies
4. There are signs of spillover of the developments 
in the Eurozone to other AEs and emerging and 
developing economies (EDEs) through the trade, fi nance 
and confidence channels. Weakening demand for 
exports, decreasing trade fi nance owing to deleveraging 
by banks in Europe and possible impact on the capital 
fl ows to emerging economies are threatening a sustained 
global recovery. The persistently high unemployment 
rates in several AEs and moderating internal demand in 
some of the emerging economies are adding to the 
problem.
Global fi nancial markets under stress
5. The global fi nancial markets remained under 
stress and experienced high volatility during the period 
under review. There was a brief period of improvement 
in sentiments following the two rounds of Long Term 
Refi nancing Operations by the European Central Bank. 
Reduced institutional appetite for the sovereign bonds 
of the troubled Eurozone economies has translated into 
funding pressures for European banks. With 
worsening access to unsecured funds, these banks 
remain vulnerable to funding market freezes and 
dependent on central bank support.
Extended run of accommodative monetary policies in 
AEs could create vulnerabilities
6. The existing regime of very low policy rates in US 
and other AEs is generally expected to continue for some 
more time. This has further reduced the cost of debt 
capital relative to equity. Going forward, this could result 
in greater use of leverage and lead to a ‘search-for-yield’ 
behaviour among investors.
Macroeconomic environment
The domestic economy has decelerated sharply
7. Domestic GDP growth declined sharply to 6.5 per 
cent during 2011-12 from 8.4 per cent in the previous 
year, weighed by global uncertainties as well as domestic 
cyclical and structural factors. The trend refl ected the 
experience of similar EDEs, especially the BRICS 
countries. The deceleration in GDP growth was refl ected 
across all the three segments of the economy – 
agriculture, services and industries. The downside risks 
to growth may persist given the headwinds from the 
global economy and moderation in private and 
government consumption and investment demand.
Inflationary pressures have moderated but risks 
remain
8. Core infl ation has moderated during the period 
under review. Nevertheless, the persistence of overall 
infl ation, in the face of signifi cant growth slowdown, 
points to serious supply bottlenecks and sticky infl ation 
expectations. While falling global commodity prices 
could aid in checking infl ationary trends in the coming 
months, the potential impact of the lagged pass-through 
of rupee depreciation, suppressed infl ation in energy 
and fertilisers and possible fi scal slippage continue to 
pose a threat.
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External sector risks aggravated; recent trends in oil 
prices provide comfort
9. The external sector vulnerability indicators point 
to increased risks. The current account deficit has 
deteriorated with decelerating growth in exports even 
as imports remained high on the back of sustained 
demand for gold and crude oil. The net international 
investment position of the country worsened with rising 
short term debt relative to total external debt. Falling 
international oil prices, if sustained, will help moderate 
external sector risks. But, domestic factors viz., a fast 
depreciating exchange rate, reduced capital infl ows and 
the risk of downgrade of the sovereign rating of the 
country, continue to pose challenges for the fi nancing 
of the defi cit.
Trends in the composition of fiscal deficit pose 
concerns
10. Fiscal risks remain elevated, given that both fi scal 
and primary defi cits have increased during 2011-12. 
Recent trends in terms of an elevated ratio of revenue 
defi cit to gross fi scal defi cit and the increasing proportion 
of revenue expenditure relative to capital outlays are 
also disquieting. Gross fi nancing needs of the Government 
remain high with consequent impact on private 
investment and growth.
Plans for fi scal consolidation afoot; risks of slippages 
remain
11. The Union Budget for 2012-13 set out a roadmap 
for fi scal consolidation during the 12th Five Year Plan 
period. The proposed fi scal consolidation for 2012-13 is 
primarily based on the revenue-raising efforts of the 
Government. The achievement of proposed reduction 
in the ratio of gross fi scal defi cit to GDP would also 
depend on the commitment of the Government to 
contain its expenditure on subsidies within the 
stipulated cap of 2 per cent of GDP in 2012-13.
Financial Markets
India’s foreign exchange market corrected and 
remained volatile
12. The turmoil in the Euro area, a widening current 
account defi cit and perceptions of slowdown in policy-
making in India affected the domestic foreign exchange 
market during the review period, resulting in a rapid 
depreciation of the Indian rupee. These trends were, 
however, broadly in line with the wider trend evidenced 
in case of currencies of EDEs, especially those with high 
current account defi cits. A combination of administrative 
measures and foreign exchange market intervention 
were taken to address the stress.
Potential rating change could impact overseas 
borrowing
13. The process of deleveraging underway amongst 
European banks has had some impact on the cost of 
borrowing of Indian fi rms and banks. A change in the 
current external rating of the country could have ‘cliff 
effects’, impacting both, the availability and the cost of 
foreign currency borrowing for Indian banks and fi rms.
The domestic equity markets reflecting weak 
sentiments
14. The domestic equity markets appreciated in the 
fi rst two months of the calendar year. Thereafter, the 
markets retraced to their December 2011 levels as 
Foreign Institutional Investment (FIIs) fl ows reversed in 
the wake of worsening global outlook, weak domestic 
sentiments and the sharp depreciation of the Indian 
rupee.
Implications of increasing use of Algorithmic and High 
Frequency Trading need to be watched
15. Some recent episodes in Indian markets have 
highlighted the need for a carefully calibrated approach 
towards technological advancements like direct market 
access supporting algorithmic and high frequency 
trading. Globally, too, the balance between the benefi ts 
of such advancements vis-à-vis the risks posed by them 
is a subject of debate.
Financial Institutions
Banks’ reliance on borrowed funds growing
16. Credit growth in the banking sector decelerated 
to around 16.3 per cent in 2011-12, as compared with 
about 22.6 per cent as at end March 2011, refl ecting the 
overall slowdown in the economy. Deposit growth also 
decelerated and, at less than 14 per cent as at end March 
2012, was the lowest growth rate recorded in the past 
10 years. The disproportionate slowdown in deposit 
growth vis-à-vis credit growth led to increased reliance 
of banks on borrowed funds, which may translate into 
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liquidity risks.
Asset quality concerns persisted; comfortable capital 
position act as cushion
17. An increase in slippage ratios, rise in the quantum 
of restructured assets and a high rate of growth in Non 
Performing Assets (NPAs) relative to credit growth 
implied that the concerns on asset quality of banks 
remain elevated. The Gross NPA ratio for scheduled 
commercial banks (SCBs) increased to 2.9 per cent as at 
end March 2012 (2.4 per cent at end March 2011). The 
position is not alarming at the current juncture and some 
comfort is also provided by the strong capital adequacy 
position of banks.
Growing interconnectedness warrants closer 
monitoring of the ‘most connected’ banks
18. Distress dependencies between banks have been 
on the rise, as evidenced by the trends in the Banking 
Stability Measures. The analysis of the network of the 
Indian banking system reveals that the maximum 
potential loss to the banking system due to the failure 
of the ‘most connected’ bank has risen during 2011. 
These trends would need to be carefully monitored, 
through rigorous microprudential supervision of the 
‘more connected’ banks.
Regulatory measures aim to mitigate risks from the 
rapid growth of gold NBFCs
19. The rapid growth of NBFCs engaged in lending 
against gold in recent years could pose risks due to the 
business model of such companies, concentration of 
business amongst a few companies and their growing 
interconnectedness with the banking system. These 
risks are sought to be addressed through various 
regulatory prescriptions.
Interconnectivities in the Indian fi nancial system 
could pose risks
20. Insurance companies and mutual funds are the 
major lenders in the Indian fi nancial system with banks, 
especially public sector banks, being the major 
borrowers. The insurance companies and mutual funds 
are, therefore, vulnerable to the risk of contagion from 
the banking system. Banks, on the other hand, are 
considerably reliant on borrowings from these entities. 
As borrowings from mutual funds are largely short term, 
they could engender greater liquidity risks for the 
banking system.
A macro mapping of the non-banking fi nancial segment 
may be warranted
21. Strengthening the regulatory framework for 
banks globally adds to risks of migration of fi nancial 
sector activity to the relatively less regulated ‘shadow 
banking’ sector. In the Indian context, the non banking 
financial sector in the country functions within a 
regulatory framework appropriate to the activities 
undertaken by these entities. Nevertheless, a review of 
the extant regulatory arrangements and a complete 
macro mapping of all kinds of credit intermediation 
activities, with regulatory focus on more systemically 
important activities and entities, may be warranted in 
the light of the international reforms.
Financial institutions remain largely resilient to credit, 
market and liquidity risks
22. Credit risks continued to remain the primary 
source of vulnerability for banks, while risks from 
adverse movements in interest rate appeared manageable, 
as evidenced by the results of a series of sensitivity stress 
tests. The banking system, as a whole, is, however, well 
positioned to absorb even severe credit risks stresses. 
Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) investments lend 
resilience to banks in managing their liquidity risks. A 
sample of banks reported a positive net marked to 
market (MTM) position on the derivatives portfolio, 
indicating that they are in a position to absorb adverse 
market movements in case of simulated historical stress 
scenarios and random sensitivity shocks.
23. NBFCs are also well positioned to withstand credit 
risk shocks given their comfortable capital adequacy 
positions. Stress tests conducted for Urban Cooperative 
Banks point to some vulnerability to both credit and 
liquidity risks.
Regulatory Infrastructure
Unintended consequences of key reform measures will 
need to be managed
24. Gaps and challenges in implementation of the 
post crisis reforms are emerging, especially with respect 
to the resolution framework for systemically important 
fi nancial institutions and reforms in the OTC derivative 
markets. There could be unintended consequences of 
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these reforms, particularly for EDEs. Differences in the 
calibration of reform measures in different jurisdictions 
may leave scope for regulatory arbitrage.
Domestic Basel III guidelines aim at a smooth 
transition
25. In line with the present regulatory requirements, 
the fi nal guidelines for Basel III also require banks in 
India to maintain a capital ratio at 9 per cent of risk 
weighted assets (RWAs), which is higher than the 8 per 
cent prescribed by the Basel Committee. The timelines 
suggested by the Basel Committee have been retained 
to enable a smooth transition. Going forward, challenges 
will be faced as the additional capital needs could impact 
the cost of capital and return on equity of banks, 
especially in the short run. The fi scal impact of the 
increased capital requirements of public sector banks 
has also to be reckoned with.
26.  A more stringent leverage ratio has been 
prescribed for the period of the parallel run considering 
that the leverage ratio of banks in India is currently well 
above the minimum ratio of 3 per cent prescribed by 
the Basel Committee.
Variations in RWAs will need to be monitored as banks 
migrate to advanced approaches under Basel II
27. Signifi cant differences in the RWA density (RWAs 
to Total Assets) have been observed across jurisdictions 
and also across banks in the same jurisdiction. These 
are generally driven by differences in the risk profi le of 
banks, their business mix and also the stage of regulatory 
evolution in the jurisdiction. There may, however, be 
practice-based inconsistencies in the calibration of risk 
parameters. Migration to advanced approaches under 
Basel II may create further scope for the emergence of 
interpretational differences. Variations in RWA density 
across bank segments have been evidenced in the Indian 
context as well, and the underlying trends will need to 
be studied.
Financial Market Infrastructure
Real time gross settlement reduces risks … but 
settlement lags need monitoring
28. Delays in settlement of transactions in the RTGS 
system, notwithstanding proactive intraday liquidity 
management by banks, the provision of intraday 
liquidity by the central bank and the availability of 
prudential reserve balances, could pose risks. The 
underlying trends of variations in settlement lags across 
different banks will also need to be monitored.
Newly issued standards and the risks posed by 
settlement banks warrant a review of CCIL’s risk 
management framework
29. The newly issued international ‘Principles for 
Financial Market Infrastructure’ proposing stringent risk 
management requirements necessitate a relook at the 
risk management practices of domestic central 
counterparties such as CCIL. Risks are also posed by the 
designated settlement banks of CCIL which act as ‘quasi’ 
payment systems and require CCIL to assume signifi cant 
uncollateralised intraday exposures to these entities. 
The trends in this regard need to be assessed vis-à-vis 
CCIL’s fi nancial resources and its liquidity and credit 
risk management framework.
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Chapter I
Macroeconomic Risks
Global and domestic outlook has worsened since the time of publication of the previous FSR. The Euro area 
sovereign debt problem is continuing to weigh on global recovery. Although slowing global growth has dampened 
commodity prices, heightened risk aversion and the resultant slowing of capital fl ows are likely to adversely 
impact emerging and developing economies (EDEs). On the domestic front, while growth has clearly decelerated, 
infl ation risks remain. Notwithstanding the moderation in core infl ation, the persistence of overall infl ation, 
in the face of signifi cant growth slowdown, points to serious supply bottlenecks and sticky infl ation expectations. 
The increase in current account defi cit (CAD), despite the slowdown in growth, is symptomatic of demand-
supply imbalances and a pointer to the need to resolve the supply bottlenecks. A widening CAD in the face of 
worsening global economic and fi nancial conditions and muted capital fl ows has exerted downward pressure 
on the rupee. Prospects for increasing capital infl ows depend on both global conditions, particularly a credible 
resolution of the Euro area situation, and an improvement in the domestic investment climate. Thus, key risks 
to domestic macroeconomic environment seem to arise from global sovereign debt problem and risk aversion, 
domestic fi scal position, widening CAD and structural aspects of food infl ation.
Macroeconomic risks to fi nancial stability higher 
since previous assessment
1.1 The uncertain global situation, rising risk 
aversion and slowing capital infl ows, largely 
resulting from the Euro area sovereign debt problem 
are impacting the EDEs. They pose challenges to 
India’s growth and balance of payments outlook. 
Domestically, the widening CAD, lower levels of 
capital fl ows and increasing share of short-term debt 
in total debt heighten external sector risks. Fiscal 
slippages and slackening in growth in the recent 
quarters have enhanced the vulnerability to shocks. 
Risks from the corporate sector balance sheets have 
remained elevated due to relatively unfavourable 
domestic and external macroeconomic environment, 
e.g. subdued domestic consumption and investment 
demand, rising costs of inputs, deceleration in exports 
and risks from unhedged foreign currency. Risks 
in the household sector, however, have moderated
(Chart 1.1).
The Global Economy
Sluggishness in global recovery becomes more 
widespread…
1.2 The global economy remained on a slow 
recovery path during the period under review. Growth 
in the advanced economies (AEs) remained sluggish in 
Chart 1.1 : Macroeconomic Risk Map
Note: Risks increase with distance from the centre
Source: RBI staff calculations
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last quarter of 2011 and fi rst quarter of 2012. IMF as 
well as the European Commission have indicated that 
the Euro area will undergo a mild recession in 2012. 
EDEs are also expected to slow down (Chart 1.2).
… with downside risks persisting
1.3 The slowdown in the Euro Area is spreading 
through trade, fi nance and confi dence channels 
to other AEs and to EDEs. In the short run, fi scal 
consolidation measures, especially in the Eurozone, 
could impact demand and growth adversely. The recent 
string of rating downgrades of Euro area sovereigns 
and banks could raise borrowing costs. Growth, both 
in the Eurozone and in other parts of the world, is 
also likely to be affected by deleveraging by EU-based 
banks1. EDEs, in particular, remain vulnerable to the 
spillovers of the accommodative monetary policies in 
AEs, especially in the Eurozone (Chapter II).
Global fi scal risks have intensifi ed
1.4 Recent developments in the Eurozone, have 
led to an intensifi cation of fi scal risks globally. 
Debt and gross fi nancing needs continue to be high 
in several AEs, even as sovereign yields are rising 
(Chart 1.3). There are concerns that the recession in 
the Eurozone may be used by countries to scale back or 
defer fi scal consolidation measures, especially in the 
current political climate. Relevant in this context is the 
observation by IMF in its Fiscal Monitor, April 2012, 
“. … Should growth slow further, countries with fi scal 
space should allow the automatic stabilizers to operate 
freely and allow the defi cit to rise to avoid excess fi scal 
contraction, which could worsen economic conditions. 
But short-term caution should not be an excuse to slow 
or delay efforts to put public fi nances on a sounder 
footing over the medium term…”
Elevated unemployment in the U.S. and rising 
unemployment in the Eurozone could add to risks
1.5 Unemployment in AEs remains high and could 
act as a drag on recovery and fi scal consolidation. The 
unemployment rate in the US increased to 8.2 per cent 
in May 2012 from 8.1 per cent in April, the fi rst increase 
in 11 months. Unemployment in the Euro area rose to 
Chart 1.2: Slower Global Recovery in 2012
(Growth in GDP)
P: Projected
Source: IMF WEO, April 2012
1 As per the Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR), April 2012, deleveraging by European banks could result in reduction of combined balance sheet 
of large banks by as much as $2.6 trillion (€2.0 trillion) through end-2013 i.e. by almost 7 per cent of total assets. The GFSR observes that one-fourth of 
this deleveraging may be effected through a reduction in lending.
Chart: 1.3: Gross Financing Needs - AEs
Note: Projected fi gures
Source: IMF Fiscal Monitor, April 2012
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11 per cent in April 2012 - the highest rate on record. 
The unemployment rate is particularly acute in Spain 
(at nearly 24.3 per cent) and in the periphery Eurozone.
Trends in global growth are mirrored in global trade 
volumes….
1.6 The slowdown in global growth is refl ected 
in sluggish trends in the volume of international 
trade (Charts 1.4 and 1.5). These trends are unlikely 
to reverse in short run given the uncertainties about 
the outlook for global growth.
The Domestic Economy
Domestic growth decelerated on the back of global 
and domestic factors
1.7 Domestic GDP growth declined sharply to 
6.5 per cent during 2011-12 from 8.4 per cent in the 
previous year, weighed by global uncertainties as well 
as domestic cyclical and structural factors. The trend 
refl ected the experience of several EDEs, especially the 
BRICS countries (Chart 1.6).
1.8 Importantly, the quarterly growth rates have 
been showing a declining trend for the preceding 
four quarters with the fourth quarter GDP growth rate 
slowing to 5.3 per cent – the lowest quarterly growth 
rate in last 7 years (Charts 1.7).
1.9 The slowdown in real GDP was refl ected in all 
the major sectors. Growth rate in agriculture at 2.8 per 
cent is due to the base effect (agriculture rate growth 
Chart 1.4: Growth in World Trade Volume
(goods and services)
P: Projected
Source: IMF WEO, April 2012
Chart 1.5: Baltic Dry Index at Low Level
Source: Bloomberg
Chart 1.6: GDP Growth in BRICS Economies
* Estimated data for South Africa
Source: IMF WEO, April 2012
Chart 1.7 Trends in Quarterly GDP Growth (Y-o-Y)
Source: CSO
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during 2010-11 stood at 7.0 per cent as against a trend 
growth of around 3.0 per cent). Slowdown in industrial 
activity is on account of weak demand for consumer 
durables, interest rate sensitivity, deceleration in 
external demand and subdued investment demand 
as well as a decline in business confi dence amidst the 
prevailing interest rate environment. Manufacturing 
slowed down from 7.6 per cent in 2010-11 to 2.5 per 
cent in 2011-12. During the same period, growth rate in 
the services sector moderated from 9.2 per cent to 8.5 
per cent and the moderation was observed in several 
segments of the sector.
Subdued corporate investments and declining net 
exports dragged down aggregate demand…
1.10 All the major drivers of domestic demand, 
recorded sharp deceleration during FY12 (Chart 1.8). 
The sharp moderation in real GDP at market prices 
from 9.6 per cent in 2010-11 to 6.9 per cent in 2011-12 
was refl ected in all components of aggregate demand 
– consumption (private and government), investment 
and net exports. Weakness in investment, in particular, 
has implications for the near and medium-term growth 
outlook.
..while declining savings and investment rates added 
to concerns
1.11 Both investment and saving rates declined in 
2010-11. Gross domestic savings rate declined from 
33.8 per cent in 2009-10 to 32.3 per cent in 2010-11 
while gross capital formation rate declined from 
36.6 per cent to 35.1 per cent. Corporate pipeline 
investment has shrunk and new investment remains 
subdued, affected by the domestic and global growth 
outlook, higher interest rates and rising input prices. 
Given these trends, the outlook for domestic growth is 
unlikely to improve in the short term.
1.12 Headwinds from the global economy will 
continue to impact domestic growth in the coming 
quarters. Going forward into 2012-13, downside risks to 
growth are likely to persist, especially if the monsoons 
are signifi cantly below long period average. The index 
of industrial production increased by just 0.1 per cent 
in April 2012. Though the manufacturing Purchasing 
Managers’ Index (PMI) for May 2012 suggested that 
industrial activity remains in expansionary mode, 
Chart 1.8: Growth in Drivers of Domestic Demand
Source: CSO
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the pace of expansion seems to have slowed down 
signifi cantly. Demand conditions may also improve, 
though constraints might be faced due to low pipeline 
investments.
Infl ationary pressures moderate but risks remain
1.13 Headline Wholesale Price Index (WPI) infl ation 
has declined largely on account of transitory factors 
including a favourable base effect and seasonal decline 
in vegetable prices. The headline WPI infl ation, 
which was above 9 per cent during April-November 
2011, moderated to 6.9 per cent by end-March 
2012, consistent with the Reserve Bank’s indicative 
projection of 7 per cent. The moderation was initially 
driven by softening of food prices and then by a decline 
in non-food manufactured products (core) infl ation, 
which fell below 5 per cent for the fi rst time in two 
years. However, headline infl ation thereafter, inched 
up to 7.6 per cent in May 2012 driven mainly by food 
and fuel prices (Chart 1.9). Notably, the consumer price 
index (CPI) infl ation (as measured by the new series, 
base year: 2010) increased sharply from 7.7 per cent in 
January, 2012 to 10.4 per cent in April, 2012.
1.14 Notwithstanding the recent moderation in 
global crude oil prices and domestic price pressures 
in manufactured products, upside risks to infl ation 
remain. The likely trends in global crude oil prices, 
going ahead, remain uncertain. Moreover, the impact 
of the lagged pass-through of rupee depreciation, 
suppressed infl ation in energy and fertilisers and 
possible fi scal slippage continue to pose a signifi cant 
threat. While moderation in global commodity prices 
could aid in checking infl ationary trends in the coming 
months, this could at least partially be offset by the 
depreciation of the rupee. Infl ation risks are likely to 
remain high, given the persistence of overall infl ation, 
even in the face of signifi cant growth slowdown which 
points to serious supply bottlenecks and sticky infl ation 
expectations.
External sector risks intensifi ed as the external sector 
vulnerability indicators deteriorated
1.15 The external sector position weakened in the 
period under review, driven by a worsening CAD, 
rising external debt and weakening Net International 
Investment Position (NIIP).
Chart 1.9: Rapid Increase in Wholesale Prices of Select Commodities
Note: Base 2004-05=100
Source: Government of India
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1.16 All the key external sector vulnerability 
indicators - the reserve cover of imports, the ratio 
of short-term debt to total external debt, the ratio of 
foreign exchange reserves to total debt, the debt service 
ratio and NIIP-GDP ratio - deteriorated (Table 1.1).
Prevailing global uncertainties accentuate risks to
the CAD...
1.17 The trade defi cit increased primarily because 
of the slowdown in global demand and the inelastic 
nature of oil imports. Pressures on the defi cit were 
further aggravated by the fact that the non-oil imports 
remained high.
1.18 Given the uncertain global environment, the CAD 
is likely to remain elevated in the near term. Though 
export demand had benefi tted in recent periods due 
to diversifi cation of export markets to EDEs, export 
growth is likely to remain sluggish in the coming 
quarters as slowdown in AEs is increasingly affecting 
growth in EDEs. The widening CAD, notwithstanding 
slowdown in growth and depreciation of the currency, 
refl ects the demand-supply imbalances and is a pointer 
to the urgent need to resolve the supply bottlenecks. 
Softening of global oil prices and the recent moderation 
in imports of gold may alleviate the pressures on 
the external defi cit. The CAD is also susceptible to 
deceleration in receipts due to moderation of software 
exports, business services and investment income.
… leading to increased risks in fi nancing the 
external defi cit
1.19 Risks to fi nancing the CAD have intensifi ed 
in recent months. Global developments such as 
deleveraging by European banks have affected capital 
fl ows, especially to emerging markets like India 
(Chapter II). The moderation in capital infl ows has 
necessitated fi nancing of the CAD by drawing down 
foreign exchange reserves in recent quarters. This has 
weakened the external sector resilience of the economy 
as discussed earlier.
1.20 Future capital infl ows will depend on conditions 
in the global economy as well as the evolving domestic 
macroeconomic environment, including the pace of 
domestic policy reforms. Domestic factors including 
slowdown, potential downgrade by rating agencies 
and a depreciating exchange rate may affect capital 
Table 1.1: External Sector Vulnerability Indicators
End-June 
2011
End-Sept 
2011
End-Dec 
2011
Reserve cover of imports (in months) 9.2 8.5 7.7
Short-term debt to total external debt (%) 21.6 22.1 23.3
Foreign exchange reserves to total 
external debt (%)
99.6 96.2 88.6
Debt service ratio (%) 4.8 5.2 7.9
Net International Investment Position to 
GDP (annualised) ratio (%)
-12.4 -11.4 -12.0
Source: RBI
infl ows. All of these are likely to pose challenges for 
the fi nancing of the CAD.
Recent measures to encourage capital infl ows may 
alleviate these risks
1.21 A host of administrative measures have been 
taken of late to improve infl ows of external commercial 
borrowings (ECBs) and NRI deposits. The increase in 
the all-in-cost ceiling, and other relaxations in ECB 
guidelines could facilitate overseas borrowings by 
corporates. Also, greater fl exibility has been given 
to banks in mobilising non-resident deposits by 
deregulating interest rates on NRE and NRO accounts in 
November 2011 and raising the ceiling on interest rates 
on FCNRB in May 2012. Exporters have been asked to 
convert half the foreign currency balances in the EEFC 
accounts to the domestic currency. FII investment in 
non-convertible debentures / bonds issued by Indian 
companies in the infrastructure sector was enhanced to 
USD 25 billion and limit for investment in Government 
securities was raised to USD 20 billion. Such measures 
are expected to provide a reprieve to the pressures on 
the external sector.
Fiscal consolidation could aid the moderation of 
external risks...
1.22 If budget defi cit is expanding and private sector 
savings and investment balance remains unchanged, 
high fi scal defi cit can be fi nanced only by expanding 
CAD. In the Indian context, the most visible link 
between the fi scal defi cit and CAD is provided by oil 
prices. As prices for a number of petroleum products 
remain administered in the domestic market and are 
not signifi cantly aligned to movement in international 
prices, a rise in international prices does not lead to 
demand adjustment in the domestic economy but 
rather results in a high import bill and higher CAD. On 
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the other hand, underpricing of petroleum products 
with no moderation in domestic demand leads to rise 
in petroleum subsidies and hence expansion of fi scal 
defi cit (Chart 1.10).
…As will waning gold imports
1.23 As discussed, imports have remained high given 
elevated global oil prices and sustained domestic 
demand for gold. India has traditionally been one of 
the largest consumers of gold in the world. This could 
potentially pose risks as domestic production of gold 
is negligible and the demand has to be met almost 
entirely through imports. In 2011- 2012, India imported 
US$ 45 billion worth of gold, an increase of 3 per cent 
year-on-year (despite a fall of 17 per cent in physical 
imports from 1034 tonnes to 854 tonnes). Gold imports 
constitute as much as 10 per cent of total imports. The 
import of gold is canalised and banks, MMTC Ltd., State 
Trading Corporations, etc. are authorised to import 
gold. Adverse movements in gold prices can also result 
in losses on loans portfolios of commercial banks and 
NBFCs (Chapter III). Recent administrative measures 
have, inter alia, led to some reduction in gold imports 
(Chart 1.11).
1.24 Demand for gold is high in India on account 
of socio-cultural factors and its use in the informal 
economy. According to a World Gold Council study, 
as much as 23 per cent of all gold imported is 
for investment purpose in India. Even its use in 
jewellery at 75 per cent has an investment element 
for households. Banks’ import of gold coins for retail 
sale to households has been a matter of concern. It 
has risen from just one per cent of total imports by 
banks in 2009-10 to 3.8 per cent in 2011-12. Diversion 
of household savings into gold has implications for the 
availability of funds of the fi nancial sector and thereby 
for growth. The high returns on gold in the recent past 
could underpin demand, thus putting pressure on the 
CAD on an ongoing basis.
Fiscal risks on the rise….
1.25 Fiscal risks have risen in the period under 
review with both fi scal and primary defi cits rising 
during 2011-12. The increased market borrowings by 
the government could crowd out private investment 
with implications for growth, besides posing 
Chart 1.10: Relationship between the Twin Defi cits
Source: RBI
Chart 1.11: Trends in Gold Imports
Source: DGCIS, Bloomberg
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challenges for monetary management. The proposed 
fi scal consolidation in 2012-13 is primarily based on 
the revenue-raising efforts of the central government. 
The achievement of budgeted reduction in GFD-GDP 
ratio would also depend on the commitment of the 
government to contain its expenditure on subsidies 
within the stipulated cap of 2 per cent of GDP in
2012-13.
…Trends in the components of the fi scal defi cit 
present some concerns
1.26 Trends in the various components of fi scal defi cit 
of Centre throw up some disquieting features in terms 
of the elevated share of revenue expenditure in total 
expenditure and declining share of capital expenditure 
in total expenditure of Centre (Charts 1.12 and 1.13). 
There are concerns that the persistently high subsidy 
burden is crowding out public investment, especially 
at the current juncture when private investment is 
slowing down. There is another concern that the gross 
fi scal defi cit of Centre continues to be predominantly 
structural rather than cyclical.
1.27 The ratio of revenue defi cit (RD) to gross fi scal 
defi cit (GFD), which indicates the proportion of 
borrowings being used to fi nance current consumption, 
has increased signifi cantly since 2008-09, thereby 
reducing the availability of resources for capital 
investment. In recognition of this concern, the RD to 
GFD ratio of Centre is budgeted lower at 68.7 per cent 
for 2012-13, as against the ratio of 75.7 per cent for 
2011-12 (RE) (Chart 1.14).
Risks may be addressed by recent attempts at fi scal 
consolidation…...but will hinge on robust tax 
buoyancy and on capping of subsidies
1.28 The Union Budget 2012-13 sets out a roadmap 
for fi scal consolidation by budgeting a signifi cant 
reduction in the ratio of gross fi scal defi cit to GDP, 
beginning from 2012-13, thereby setting the stage for 
attaining a ‘faster, sustainable and more inclusive 
growth’ during the 12th Five Year Plan period.
1.29 The fi scal correction for the ensuing year is 
primarily revenue-driven through widening of base of 
the services tax, stipulating a negative list of exempted 
categories in respect of services tax, rationalization of 
Chart 1.12: Revenue Expenditure as Proportion to
Total Expenditure of Centre
Source: Government of India
Chart 1.13: Capital Expenditure as Proportion to
Total Expenditure of Centre
Source: Government of India
Chart 1.14: Revenue Defi cit as a Proportion of
Gross Fiscal Defi cit of Centre
Source: Government of India
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custom duty rates and partial rollback of crisis-related 
reductions in various indirect tax rates. The revenue 
outcome in 2012-13 would, however, hinge on the 
realisation of the budgeted gross tax buoyancy which, 
at 1.39 for 2012-13, is signifi cantly higher than the 
long-term average tax buoyancy of 1.11 for the period 
2003-04 to 2011-12 as well as the average of 1.14 for the 
recent period 2010-11 to 2011-12.
1.30 On the expenditure side, there are latent 
pressures on Central government fi nances for 2012-13. 
On the petroleum subsidy front, upside risks stem from 
volatile international crude oil prices and fl uctuations 
in the exchange rate. Also, the budgeted growth of 3 per 
cent in food subsidies in 2012-13 appears to be modest 
when viewed in the context of the implementation 
of the Food Security Bill. Against this backdrop, the 
capping of subsidies by Central government at 2 per 
cent of GDP is a welcome step but avoidance of fi scal 
slippages would necessitate steps to allow fuller pass 
through of international crude oil and fertiliser prices.
Household Risks have moderated
1.31 Risks posed by the household sector have 
declined, as evidenced by the trends in the 
Macroeconomic Risk Map. Delinquencies in retail 
sector have moderated while growth in retail credit has 
decelerated. As debt-fi nanced consumption continues 
to be low in India, it does not seem to be a source of 
signifi cant risk from the perspective of the system as a 
whole. (Chart 1.15).
Elevated corporate sector risks with rising costs and 
declining profi ts
1.32 Risks to health of the corporate sector in the 
economy remain elevated. Recent corporate results 
point to falling profi tability due to rise in input costs, 
including interest costs, and moderation of external 
and domestic demand (Chart 1.16). Firm oil prices, 
stickiness in manufactured input prices, higher import 
costs associated with the depreciation of the exchange 
rate and continuance of moderation in external and 
domestic demand emerge as important source of 
risks to the balance sheet of corporate and need to be 
monitored. Reserve Bank’s Industrial Outlook Survey 
also indicated that the present industrial slowdown is 
expected to continue for some time.
Chart 1.15: Growth in Retail Credit, NPA and PFCE
PFCE: Private fi nal consumption expenditure
Ret Cr: Retail credit
Source: CSO, RBI
Chart 1.16: Falling Profi t Margins and Rising Interest Costs
Source: RBI
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Chapter II
Financial Markets
I. Global Markets
Lingering European debt crisis cast a shadow on 
fi nancial markets
2.1 The European sovereign debt crisis had caused 
funding strains for sovereigns and, in their wake, for 
European banks since the onset of the fi nancial crisis. 
This intensifi ed towards the end of 2011. There was 
persistent uncertainty over the exact terms of fi scal relief 
for Greece. The rating downgrades of European banks 
and sovereigns have added to the strains experienced 
by fi nancial markets.
ECB’s policy support rescued sentiment temporarily
2.2 Stronger than expected US economic data and the 
European Central Bank (ECB)’s fi rst three-year Longer-
Term Refi nancing Operation1 (LTRO) in December 2011 
were mainly responsible for changing market sentiment 
in early part of 2012 as investor risk appetite recovered. 
The ECB followed up the first round of LTRO in 
December 2011 with another one in February 2012, 
Globally, uncertainty and risk aversion reigned in the fi nancial markets as sovereign default risk, fragility in 
the banking sector and funding strains for sovereigns and banks continued to haunt the Euro area. Policymakers, 
posed with fresh challenges, had to innovate constantly to address the panic and keep the markets stable. 
Unconventional policy measures have been initiated by governments and central banks during the last two 
years, to deal with the situation. While the measures have brought temporary respite to the fi nancial markets 
and the economies, the structural nature of the problems persist and the Eurozone crisis, remains a major threat 
to global fi nancial stability. The improvement in sentiment in the early part of 2012 has given way to gloom 
as popular dissent against tough austerity measures has made it diffi cult for democratically elected governments 
to act. The concerns of a Greek exit from the European monetary union increased uncertainty during the 
period under review. The falling momentum in domestic growth in India as well as the rising current account 
defi cit and the growing fi scal gap are eroding investor confi dence. While the domestic money and bond markets 
remain relatively unaffected by external turbulence, the foreign exchange and equity markets have witnessed 
high levels of volatility. A combination of foreign exchange market intervention and administrative measures 
have been taken to address the stress in foreign exchange markets. Sentiment in Indian equity markets is likely 
to remain tied to developments in global and domestic macroeconomic situation.
1 The ECB usually conducts overnight, weekly and monthly repos. During the fi nancial crisis, it started conducting longer term repos for 1-year maturities. 
This program was expanded further for unlimited sums for three years with considerable relaxation in quality and nature of collateral accepted.
taking the total policy support from this measure to over 
1 trillion. The LTROs provided fi nance for stressed 
sovereigns and banks. Bank and sovereign CDS spreads 
tightened signifi cantly. Strains in US dollar funding 
markets appeared to ease (Chart 2.1).
Chart 2.1: Money Market Spreads in 2012 in US Dollars and Euros
Source: Bloomberg
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Sovereign debt sustainability concerns resurfaced...
2.3 Policy measures proved unsuccessful in providing 
sustained relief. The broad fi nancial market rally that 
followed the unconventional monetary policy measures 
taken in late 2011 and early 2012 has subsided. Global 
markets were concerned about elevated risks from 
Greece during the period under review (Box Item 2.1). 
While the size of fi rewalls for fi scal risks in Europe have 
been raised, doubts over their capacity to support larger 
countries such as Spain or Italy in case of a contagion, 
have weakened market confi dence.
...with widening of spreads on sovereign bonds
2.4 Sovereign CDS spreads have widened signifi cantly, 
especially in Spain and Italy (Chart 2.2). Several 
institutions lowered risk limits for sovereign bonds of 
the troubled economies in Eurozone due to adverse 
developments and the higher notional losses on such 
bond holdings (as a result of higher volatility). This 
reduced the institutional appetite for bonds and affected 
their liquidity. The implied volatilities of the bond, stock, 
and foreign exchange markets point to an uncertain 
environment (Chart 2.3).
Structural issues remain to be addressed
2.5 Some European banks continue to be heavily 
reliant on wholesale funding. However, the maturities 
of bank borrowings have been shortened owing to 
market conditions. Further, their access to unsecured 
funds has also worsened. This fragility makes banks 
vulnerable to funding market freezes and has signifi cantly 
increased their dependence on central bank support. 
Chart 2.2: Sovereign CDS Spreads in Europe in 2012
Source: Bloomberg
Chart 2.3: Volatilities of Various Asset Classes2
Source: Bloomberg
Greece received a second bailout package from the IMF-EU-ECB 
troika in February 2012 after its fi scal situation failed to improve 
to the extent expected. The second restructuring involved an 
effective loss of as much as 75 percent for private bond holders 
in order to reduce Greece’s debt burden. Outcomes of recent 
elections in Europe point to anti-incumbency on account of 
austerity measures. The contrasting experiences of Ireland and 
Iceland are a pointer for the Greek situation. Ireland, which 
is in the Euro currency union, is still on negative growth 
trajectory, despite adhering to austerity measures imposed by 
lenders. Iceland, in contrast, has rebounded with good growth 
rates in 2011 through depreciation of its currency and by 
passing on losses to its lenders. Iceland grew at 4.5 per cent 
in Q1 2012 compared to 0 per cent for the European Union. In 
fact, the central bank of Iceland has been hiking interest rates 
since Q3 2011. The outcome of the second election in Greece 
in June 2012 appears to favour the continuation of Greece in 
the monetary union.
Box 2.1 : The Greek Dilemma
2 Volatilities are represented for currencies by 1-month implied vols of EUR/US$, for equities by US’ VIX index and for bonds by the Merrill Lynch’s 
MOVE index for US treasuries.
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Rating agency, Moody’s Investor Service cut ratings of 
15 major banks by one to three notches, in another round 
of rating downgrades in mid-June 2012. 
Accommodative monetary policy in advanced countries 
has externalities
2.6 In the United States, macroeconomic indicators 
point to a slow recovery, though the sustainability of 
the recovery remains uncertain. Central banks in 
advanced economies (AEs) are continuing their 
accommodative monetary policies. Policy rates have 
been at or near historic lows in many AEs, with a 
commitment to continue these levels for some more 
time. This, in turn, induces greater leverage and a 
progressive easing of lending standards. From a 
corporate issuer’s point of view, the cost of raising fund 
by issuance of bonds has become more attractive, relative 
to equity. A surge in corporate borrowings could increase 
systemic leverage in the process. There are signs that 
continuously low interest rates may start to feed into a 
search-for-yield behaviour in global fi nancial markets 
(Chart 2.4).
II. Domestic Markets
Foreign exchange market exhibited considerable stress
2.7 Developments in Euro area and deterioration in 
global macroeconomy were among the factors that 
contributed to stress in the domestic foreign exchange 
market during the period under review. The other three 
components of the Financial Markets Stability Map 
(Chart 2.5), viz. banking sector funding, debt and equity 
markets, remained largely unchanged in comparison. 
The rise in the Financial Markets Stability Indicator 
(Chart 2.6) is largely driven by the fall in the rupee to 
historical lows and rise in its volatility.
Sovereign bond yields refl ected fi scal slippages
2.8 Bond yields moved higher towards the end of 
March and early April 2012 (Chart 2.7) on account of 
persistently tight liquidity conditions and an 
unanticipated rise in budgeted government borrowings 
for 2012-13. Subsequently they have stayed in a range 
Chart 2.4: Interest Rate Differential Between Indian Rates and 
those of US and Euro3
Source: Bloomberg
Chart 2.5: Financial Markets Stability Map
Note : Movement away from centre implies higher risk
Chart 2.6: Financial Markets Stability Indicator
Note : Higher value denotes higher risk. Shaded portion indicated in 
red is projection
3 10-year rates on Indian government bonds are used as investment and US dollar and Euro Libor rates are used as borrowing rates.
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between 8.5 per cent and 8.8 per cent for 10-year 
maturities. The fi nancial markets remained unconvinced 
about the ability of the government to bring down the 
high level of fi scal defi cit. The gross and net market 
borrowing of the Central Government through dated 
securities have been budgeted at ` 5696 billion and
` 4790 billion, respectively during 2012-13. This is higher 
by 11.7 per cent and 9.8 per cent, respectively over the 
last year. The Central Government proposes to fi nance 
only 2 per cent of the budget through treasury bills, 
signifi cantly lower than 22 per cent in 2011-12. A cut in 
the Reserve Banks’ policy rate by 50 basis points, inter 
alia, brought 10-year government bond yields closer to 
8 per cent.
Indian sovereign bond market remained largely 
insulated from overseas pressures
2.9 During the period under review, the rating 
agencies, S&P and Fitch, changed the outlook on Indian 
sovereign debt and 11 banks /institutions, from stable 
to negative. Though the government bond yields rose 
marginally on the news of change in the rating outlook, 
they quickly retraced. Since the Central Government 
does not borrow in the offshore markets and reliance 
on outside investors by way of Foreign Institutional 
Investment (FII) is limited, the impact was muted.
Liquidity conditions improved after tightness in March
2.10 Liquidity conditions in Indian money market 
remained tight, during the period under review, outside 
of the Reserve Bank’s indicative comfort level of (+)/(-) 
one per cent of net demand and time liabilities (NDTL) 
of banks. Average net injection of liquidity under the 
daily liquidity adjustment facility (LAF) increased from 
around `0.5 trillion during April-September 2011 to 
around ` 1.6 trillion during March 2012. The increase in 
currency in circulation, quarterly tax outgo from all fi rms 
and the foreign exchange market intervention operations 
sucked liquidity out of the banking system. The Reserve 
Bank injected liquidity by conducting open market 
operations (OMOs) and reducing the cash reserve ratio 
(CRR) by 125 basis points. The Systemic Liquidity 
Indicator (Chapter V) exhibits the stress felt in funding 
liquidity for banks and others.
Chart 2.7: Indian Government Bond Yields in 2012
Source: Bloomberg
Rating change could impact the cost and availability 
of foreign currency borrowing
2.11 The process of deleveraging underway among 
European banks has raised the cost of borrowing for 
Indian fi rms and banks. Smaller borrowers have found 
their traditional funding lines withdrawn. A large part 
of foreign currency borrowings of Indian fi rms and banks 
is in the form of loans (External Commercial Borrowings) 
rather than bonds. The current external rating of India 
stands at BBB- (with a negative watch by S&P and Fitch 
and Baa3 by Moody’s). A rating change could have some 
‘cliff effects’. This could affect both availability and cost 
of foreign currency credit lines for Indian corporates 
further. The impact is also being felt by Indian banks as 
they are the primary source of foreign currency 
denominated funding for Indian firms like buyer’s 
credit. Indian fi nancial institutions and non-banking 
fi nancial companies (NBFCs) in the public sector have 
been large benefi ciaries of FII investments in debt in the 
past. These institutions, could also face the impact of a 
reduction in FII infl ows.
Forex market remained volatile
2.12 Concerns over high twin defi cits of the country, 
re-emergence of global macroeconomic tensions and the 
European sovereign debt crisis have been the key factors 
behind the weakening rupee. The Reserve Bank has been 
using a mix of foreign exchange market interventions 
and administrative measures to address the volatility 
arising from tensions in the market place. The 
depreciation of the rupee followed the general trend of 
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currencies of EDEs, especially those with high current 
account defi cits (Chart 2.8). 
Reserves fell moderately
2.13 Adequacy of reserves has emerged as an important 
parameter in gauging the ability of a country to absorb 
external shocks. At the end of September 2011, the 
import cover declined to 8.5 months from 9.6 months 
at end-March 2011.The ratio of short-term debt to the 
foreign exchange reserves was 21.3 per cent at end-
March 2011 and it increased to 23 per cent at end-
September 2011. The ratio of volatile capital flows 
(defi ned to include cumulative portfolio infl ows and 
short-term debt) to the reserves increased from 67.3 per 
cent as at end-March 2011 to 68.3 per cent as at end-
September 2011.
2.14 With the changing profi le of capital fl ows, the 
traditional approach of assessing reserve adequacy in 
terms of import cover has been broadened to include a 
number of parameters which take into account the size, 
composition and risk profi les of various types of capital 
fl ows as well as the types of external shocks to which 
the economy is vulnerable. In the recent period, 
assessment of reserve adequacy is being done using 
some new measures, including ‘Liquidity at Risk’ (LaR). 
The LaR approach requires that a country’s foreign 
exchange liquidity position could be calculated under a 
range of possible outcomes for relevant financial 
variables, such as, exchange rates, commodity prices, 
credit spreads etc. 
Recent Rupee weakness found echo in stock market 
sentiment
2.15 The Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) 
Emerging Markets index reported a fi rst quarter gain of 
13.2 per cent in Q1 2012. Stock markets in India mirrored 
the movement in other emerging markets in Asia and 
elsewhere. The initial optimism fuelled by increased 
liquidity provided by ECB and the resolution of 
uncertainties relating to the second debt package for 
Greece quickly waned. Retrenchment by FIIs in India (as 
also abroad) led to a correction in Indian stock indices 
back to their December 2011 lows. The US dollar rate of 
return to foreign investors worsened with the 
depreciation of the Indian rupee and this, in turn, 
reduced the attractiveness of Indian equity (Chart 2.9).
Chart 2.8: Currencies of EDEs with Current Account Defi cits
Source: Bloomberg
Chart 2.9: Weekly Returns of Nifty and Defty4 in 2012
Source: Bloomberg
4 Defty is the S&P CNX Defty index and is a Dollar denominated value of NSE’s Nifty Index.
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Some episodes have highlighted the possible risks 
from Algo and High Frequency Trades
2.16 In recent period, there have been many instances 
of extreme volatility and disruptions witnessed in Indian 
stock markets, resulting from various causes which can 
be directly or indirectly attributed to the increasing use 
of Algorithmic5 (Algo) and High Frequency Trading 
(HFT)6. The Financial Stability Report of June 2011 had 
mentioned about the possible risk implications of a rapid 
move towards technological advancements like 
introduction of Direct Market Access (DMA)7, facilitating 
Algo trading and HFT for Indian stock markets. In India 
only about17 per cent and 11 per cent of cash market 
turnover in NSE and BSE respectively are on account of 
Algo and HFT in recent months. This proportion is much 
lower than that in developed markets like US and 
Europe.
5  Algo trading refers to the use of electronic platforms for entering trading orders with a computer program (algorithm) determining the decisions on 
aspects such as the timing, price, or quantity of the order, or in many cases initiating the order without human intervention.
6  The HFT is a special class of Algo trading, in which computers make elaborate decisions to initiate orders based on electronically accessed information, 
at a very fast speed (in microseconds), before human traders are capable of processing the information they observe.
7 Direct Market Access (DMA) is a facility that allows ‘clients’ to directly access the broker’s trading infrastructure (linked to the exchange trading system) 
without any manual intervention by the broker, resulting in advantages such as direct control over and faster execution of client orders, orders, reduced 
risk of errors associated with manual order entries, greater transparency, increased liquidity, lower impact costs for large orders, better audit trails and 
better use of hedging and arbitrage opportunities through the use of decision support tools/algorithms for trading.
2.17 Indian stock exchanges already have features like 
circuit breakers on stocks (having derivative trading) 
and indices, dummy price band for no band securities, 
quantity alert check, consolidated audit trail and trade 
cancellation policy and other risk reduction procedures 
to detect manipulation and deal with the possible risks. 
There is a need to balance the need for technological 
advancements with a pragmatic approach to the 
intended benefi ts of the innovations. This assumes 
even more signifi cance for India as efforts are being 
made to increase the retail participation in the Indian 
securities markets to change the largely institutional 
character of the market. The regulators and policy 
makers need to continue to assess the system-wide 
impact of such trading, from the perspective of current 
priority for a broad-based development of fi nancial 
markets.
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Chapter III
Financial Institutions: Soundness and Resilience
Soundness of Financial Institutions
Banking Stability Map and Indicator1
Risks to the banking sector remain elevated
3.1 Vulnerabilities in the banking sector exhibited a 
mixed trend at the end of March 2012 as revealed by the 
Banking Stability Map. The soundness and profi tability 
indicators showed some improvement over the position 
as at end September 2011. Soundness indicators, 
however, showed a deterioration vis-à-vis their position 
The stability of the banking sector deteriorated marginally in the period since September 2011. The soundness 
indicators of banks, however, remained robust. Asset quality pressures persisted while credit growth decelerated, 
largely refl ecting the slowdown in the economy. As the divergence between credit and deposit growth widened, 
banks’ reliance on borrowed funds increased, heightening associated liquidity risks. Going into 2012-13, the 
operating conditions for the Indian banks are expected to remain challenging given the weakening global 
economic outlook, adverse domestic macroeconomic conditions and policy uncertainties. Banks in India are 
likely to be affected due to deleveraging in advanced countries though the direct impact is expected to be limited. 
Credit growth of the non banking fi nancial companies has decelerated. Regulatory restraints have been put 
in place to rein in the risks posed by exposure of banks to gold loan companies. The stress tests carried out on 
banks, incorporating a range of shocks, revealed deterioration in their capital position as compared with the 
baseline scenario, but the banking system remained resilient even under extreme stress scenarios. A series of 
scenarios and sensitivity stress tests applied on select banks’ derivatives portfolio revealed that they are well 
positioned to manage the resultant market risks.
1 For methodology and details, please refer to the Annex.
Chart 3.1 : Banking Stability Map
Note: Away from the centre signifi es increase in risk
Source : RBI staff calculations
Chart 3.2 : Banking Stability Indicator
Note: (i) Increase in indicator value shows lower stability
 (ii) Jun 2012 and Sep 2012 are forecasted values indicated by the 
shaded region
Source : RBI staff calculations
in March 2011. Strains in asset quality intensifi ed. The 
liquidity defi cit added to the stress in the banking sector 
(Chart 3.1).
3.2 The Banking Stability Indicator, as at end March 
2012, pointed to deterioration in the stability of the 
banking sector, compared with its position in September 
2011. A forecast of the indicator for the next two quarters 
surmised that the risks to the banking sector are likely 
to remain elevated in the near term (Chart 3.2).
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Deleveraging trends in global banking expected to 
continue...
3.3 The confl uence of funding strains and sovereign 
risks led to fears of a precipitous deleveraging process 
that could hurt fi nancial markets and the wider economy 
via asset sales and contractions in credit (Chapters I and 
II). Many European banks have announced medium-
term business plans for reducing assets. The impact is 
likely to differ signifi cantly across regions, with larger 
effects expected in emerging Europe than in Asia or Latin 
America (Table 3.1). In the Indian context, the claims of 
European banks, amounting to US$ 146 billion, formed 
53 per cent of total consolidated foreign claims. Of 
this, 56 per cent pertained to claims of banks in United 
Kingdom.
… with limited impact possible for domestic credit 
availability
3.4 The direct impact of the Eurozone crisis on 
Indian banks is expected to be limited. The Indian 
banking sector is dominated by domestic banks with 
foreign banks accounting for only 8 per cent of total 
banking sector assets and 5 per cent of banking sector 
credit. There could, however, be indirect impact on 
Indian banks due to their exposures to other countries, 
especially in the Eurozone (Charts 3.3 and 3.4).
3.5 The direct impact of deleveraging is not expected 
to be signifi cant on domestic credit availability although 
specialised types of fi nancing like structured long term 
finance, project finance and trade finance could be 
impacted.
Table 3.1 : Consolidated Foreign Claims of European Banks
(in US$ billion)
Jun-2011 Dec-2011
Developing Europe 1304 1137
Developing Asia and Pacifi c 935 841
of which, India 159 146
Developing Latin America and Caribbean 855 770
Source : Locational Banking Statistics - Dec 2011, BIS
Chart 3.3 : Claims by Indian Banks on Select Countries – Position
as on Dec 2011
Source : Data collected from a sample of 50 banks that form 90 per cent 
of banking sector assets
Chart 3.4 : Claims on Indian Banks by Select Countries as Ratio of 
Indian Banking Sector Assets
Source : Locational Banking Statistics - Dec 2011, BIS
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Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs)
Credit and deposit growth weakens, reverberating 
slowdown concerns in the economy
3.6 Balance sheet of SCBs expanded by 14.5 per cent 
during 2011-12, lower than the growth of 18.8 per cent 
for 2010-11. The deceleration was refl ected in the growth 
rates of both credit and deposits. Credit growth in the 
banking sector, at 16.3 per cent in 2011-12, was lower 
than the 22.6 per cent recorded in 2010-11. Deposit 
growth stood at 13.7 per cent and 17.7 per cent for the 
two years respectively. The growth rate of deposits in 
2011-12 was the lowest recorded in the past 10 years.
3.7 These trends broadly refl ected the slowdown in 
the economy, as the nominal GDP growth decelerated 
from 18.8 per cent in 2010-11 to 15.4 per cent in
2011-12. Benchmarking of the interest rates on small 
savings schemes to market determined rates of interest 
as well as availability of liquid funds with higher yield 
and associated tax benefi ts may have also contributed 
to the deceleration in growth rate of deposits of banks.
Slowdown in credit driven by slowdown in some 
specifi c sectors…
3.8 The deceleration in credit growth was particularly 
marked in case of the priority sector, real estate and 
infrastructure segments, which together account for 
nearly 60 per cent of banking sector credit (Chart 3.5).
… and amongst public sector banks
3.9 The deceleration was most pronounced in the 
credit growth of Public Sector Banks (PSBs) while the old 
private sector banks recorded a sharper credit growth of 
24 per cent. Expansion of credit to retail and real estate 
sectors accounted for the bulk of the growth in credit 
among the old private sector banks – a trend which would 
need to be carefully monitored, if sustained (Chart 3.6).
CD ratio increased consequent on divergence between 
credit and deposit growth rates …
3.10 The credit to deposit (CD) ratio increased to 76 
per cent as at end March 2012 (as against 73.5 per cent 
as at end September 2011 and 74.3 per cent as at end 
March 2011) driven by the divergence between deposit 
and credit growth rates in 2011-12. The incremental CD 
ratio also remained high at 88 per cent. The incremental 
Investment to Deposit (ID) ratio rose sharply on the back 
of a 17 per cent growth in investments (Chart 3.7).
Chart 3.5 : Growth Rate of Bank Credit to Select Sectors
Source : RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 3.6 : Credit Growth in Various Sectors - Bank Group Wise
Source : RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 3.7 : CD/ID ratio and Incremental CD/ID ratio of SCBs
Source : RBI Supervisory Returns
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… and banks’ reliance on borrowed funds increased
3.11 Banks, during 2011-12, increasingly relied on 
borrowings to fund their credit and investment growth. 
This was evidenced by the increasing gap between the 
combined growth of advances and investments and that 
of deposits and capital (Chart 3.8). This was accompanied 
by the growing short term maturity mismatches in the 
balance sheet of banks (Chart 3.9). The rollover and 
liquidity risks associated with these trends will need to 
be assessed and managed.
Capital ratios recover as credit growth slows
3.12 The capital ratios of the SCBs improved marginally 
since September 2011, primarily due to slowdown 
in growth of credit. There was, however, a marginal 
deterioration in comparison with the position as on 
March 2011. Capital to Risk weighted Assets Ratio 
(CRAR) fell from 14.2 per cent as at end March 2011 to 
13.5 per cent as at end September 2011, but recovered 
to 14.1 per cent as at end March 2012. Core CRAR fell 
from 10 per cent as at end March 2011 to 9.6 per cent 
as at end September 2011, but rose to 10.3 per cent as 
at end March 2012 (Chart 3.10).
Asset quality concerns persist as NPA ratios remain 
high
3.13 Asset quality concerns persist as the growth in 
non performing assets (NPAs) accelerated and continued 
to outpace credit growth. The respondents of the second 
Systemic Risk Survey conducted by the Reserve Bank 
(Chapter V) also identifi ed asset quality as one of the 
critical risks faced by the Indian banking sector.
3.14 The Gross NPA ratio increased to 2.9 per cent as at 
end March 2012, as against 2.4 per cent as at end March 
2011 and 2.8 per cent as at end September 2011. Net 
NPA ratio stood at 1.3 per cent as at end March 2012, as 
against 0.9 per cent as at end March 2011 and 1.2 per 
cent as at end September 2011. The ratio of NPAs (net of 
provisions) to capital also falls short when benchmarked 
against the peer economies (Chart 3.11).
Chart 3.8 : Growth Rate of Select Components of Balance Sheet
Note: Adv+Inv-Growth: Growth rate of advances and investments  
Depo+Cap n Resrv-Growth: Growth rate of deposits and capital 
and reserves
 Borrg Growth: Growth rate of Borrowings
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 3.9 : Maturity Profi le of Deposits and Advances
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
2 Divergence denotes the gap between growth rate of advances and investments and deposit and capital. A positive gap implies that the growth rate of 
deposits and capital was not suffi cient to meet the growth of advances and investments leading to increased reliance on borrowed funds.
Chart 3.10 : CRAR of Bank Groups
Source : RBI Supervisory Returns
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Growth in NPAs outpaced credit growth by a wide 
margin
3.15 NPAs grew at 43.9 per cent as at end March 
2012, far outpacing credit growth of 16.3 per cent. 
The divergence in growth rate of credit and NPAs has 
widened in the recent period, which could put further 
pressure on asset quality in the near term (Chart 3.12).
Accretions to NPAs accelerated
3.16 The slippage ratio3 increased to 2.1 per cent as at 
end March 2012 from 1.6 per cent at March 2011 and 
1.9 per cent at September 2011.The ratio of slippages 
plus restructured standard advances to recoveries 
(excluding up-gradations) also exhibited an increasing 
trend underscoring the concerns with respect to asset 
quality, and the need for proactive management of NPAs 
by banks (Chart 3.13).
Restructuring of advances is on the increase…
3.17 Due to a spillover of the global financial 
crisis to the Indian economy, certain relaxations4
 were permitted on restructuring on a temporary basis in 
the later part of 2008-09, which helped in tiding over the 
diffi culties faced by the real sector. However, it led to a 
signifi cant increase in the level of restructured standard 
assets during 2008-09 and 2009-10, after which there 
was a deceleration in the amount of restructured assets. 
In 2011-12, the quantum of restructured accounts has 
again increased sharply, outpacing both credit growth 
and growth rate of gross NPAs (Chart 3.14).
Chart 3.12 : Trend in Growth Rate of Gross NPAs vis-à-vis
Loans & Advances
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 3.13 : Slippages as Ratio of Recoveries
Note : * Recoveries include write off
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
3  The slippage ratio is defi ned as the ratio of slippages i.e. fresh accretion to NPAs during the year to standard advances at the beginning of the year.
4  RBI Circular titled “Prudential Guidelines on Restructuring of Advances by banks” (No. RBI/2008-09/143 DBOD.No.BP.BC.No.37 /21.04.132/2008-09 
dated August 27, 2008)
Chart 3.11: Ratio of Net NPAs to Capital of Banks in Select Countries
Source: Financial Soundness Indicators - Dec 2011, IMF 
Chart 3.14 : Growth of Restructured Accounts vis-à-vis NPAs and Loans
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
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…and could weigh on NPA ratios, going forward
3.18 An empirical analysis of the asset quality of 
banks’ advances portfolio was conducted by adding 
back the advances written off by banks during the last 
fi ve years and (separately) assuming that 15 per cent of 
restructured accounts slip into impaired category. The 
resultant ratios exhibited an increasing trend that calls 
for a closer look at the underlying management of NPAs 
by banks (Chart 3.15).
Asset quality in some key sectors remained under 
strain
3.19 The increase in gross NPAs for the year ending 
March 2012 was largely contributed by some key sectors 
viz., priority sector, retail and real estate. The growth 
rate of NPAs in the infrastructure segment, however, 
decelerated as at end March 2012, partially on account 
of base effects and sharp moderation in credit to 
infrastructure projects (Table 3.2 and Chart 3.16). Certain 
sectors like power and airlines saw signifi cant increase 
in impairments (Box 3.1).
Table 3.2 : Asset Quality of Select Sectors - Mar 2012
Chart 3.15 :  NPA Ratios of SCBs
Source: Supervisory Returns and RBI staff calculations
Chart 3.16 : Growth rate of NPAs of Select Sectors
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
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Chart 3.17 : Exposure of SCBs to Power Sector
Note: Exposure comprises of fund and non fund based credit as well 
as investments
Source: RBI staff calculations
The risks faced by banks on their exposure to the power 
sector due to rising losses and debt levels in state electricity 
boards (SEBs) and the shortage of fuel availability for power 
generation were discussed in the FSR for December 2011. 
Potential pressures on asset quality have intensifi ed with 
restructuring in bank credit to power sector registering a 
sharp increase, especially in the last quarter of 2011-12, 
even as impairments as a ratio of outstanding credit has 
moderated. Meanwhile, the losses of SEBs have also been 
mounting6, adding to the concerns about asset quality in the 
sector (Charts 3.17 and 3.18).
Chart 3.19 : Bank Credit to Airlines Sector
Source: RBI staff calculations
Chart 3.20 : Top 10 Banks in terms of Credit to Airlines Sector
Source: RBI staff calculations
5  Statistics based on data collected from 67 banks that represent 91 per cent of total assets of SCBs, unless specifi ed otherwise.
6  An estimate by CRISIL puts net losses of power distribution companies to around ` 400 billion in 2010-11.
Box 3.1 : Power and Airlines : Sectors under Stress5
increases in impairment and restructuring in the sector saw 
the share of this sector in aggregate banking system NPA 
and restructured assets rise disproportionate to its share 
in banking sector credit (Chart 3.19). There was signifi cant 
concentration discernible in distribution of credit to the 
airline sector as ten banks accounted for almost 86 per cent 
of total bank credit to this sector. As at end-March 2012, 
nearly three quarters of the advances of banks, which have 
an exposure of above `10 billion to the airline industry, were 
either impaired or restructured. PSBs accounted for the major 
share of these exposures (Chart 3.20).
Going forward, the sectors are likely to continue facing 
funding constraints and could also be affected by prevalent 
policy uncertainties. These could pose challenges to the asset 
quality of credit to these sectors.
Asset quality of banks’ credit to the airlines industry came 
under some stress in recent periods, driven largely by the 
performance of some specifi c airline companies. Sharp 
Chart 3.18 : NPA and Restructured Accounts in Power Sector
Source: RBI staff calculations
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Further strains on asset quality could emerge; though 
the strong capital position provides cushion
3.20 The muted economic backdrop and global 
headwinds could lead to further deterioration in asset 
quality. The position is not alarming at the current 
juncture and some comfort is provided by the strong 
capital adequacy of banks which ensure that the 
banking system remains resilient even in the unlikely 
contingenc y of having to absorb the entire existing stock 
of NPAs (Chart 3.21). A series of credit risk stress tests 
also testify to the resilience of banks (paragraphs 3.43 
to 3.45).
Profi tability indicators display mixed trends
3.21 SCBs continued to register healthy profi ts, though 
the growth rate of earnings has decelerated (Chart 3.22). 
Return on assets (RoA), return on equity (RoE) and net 
interest margin (NIM) have declined marginally as at end 
March 2012, relative to end March 2011 (Chart 3.23). 
Going forward, the growth of earnings could be affected 
due to lower credit off-take and asset quality concerns.
Interest rate swaps dominate off balance sheet assets 
of banks
3.22 The aggregate notional amount of off balance 
sheet (OBS) assets of the SCBs far exceeded the size 
of their on-balance sheet assets (Chart 3.24). The 
distribution of total OBS assets (in terms of notional 
amount) showed concentration of about 64 per cent in 
foreign banks followed by 17 per cent in case of PSBs. In 
the case of derivatives, foreign banks constituted 70 per 
Chart 3.21 : CRAR in the Eventuality of Write off of
Existing Stock of NPAs (net)
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 3.22 : Growth Rate of Earnings
Note : EBPT – Earnings Before Provisions and Taxes
            PAT – Profi t After Taxes
Source : RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 3.23 : Profi tability Ratios
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 3.24 : OBS Assets (Notional Principal) as a Ratio of
Balance Sheet Assets
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
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cent of total notional amount, followed by new private 
sector banks at 16 per cent. Among the OBS constituents, 
the most prominent segment was Interest Rate Swaps 
(IRS).
Banks geared to absorb market risks from their 
derivatives portfolio; will need to manage the resultant 
credit risks
3.23 An analysis of derivatives portfolio of a sample 
of banks7 revealed that most banks reported a positive 
net mark-to-market (MTM) position. The dominance of 
foreign banks in the derivatives segment was evident 
as the proportion of gross positive as well as negative 
MTM to capital stood, on an average, at around 250 per 
cent for foreign banks compared with 16 per cent in case 
of the other banks in the sample. Net MTM as a ratio 
of capital varied between a positive of 30 per cent to a 
negative of 10 per cent (Charts 3.25 and 3.26).
3.24 A series of stress tests was carried out on the 
derivatives portfolio by the select banks based on 
a common set of historical scenarios and random 
sensitivity shocks (Box 3.2). The post-stress net MTM 
position was positive for most banks suggesting that 
the banks are well geared to absorb adverse market 
movements. However, banks remained exposed to 
the risks of counterparty failure, especially in case 
of disputes with clients over payment, as had been 
evidenced in the past.
Non Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs)
Credit growth decelerated amidst declining asset 
quality and profi tability
3.25 NBFCs experienced deceleration in growth 
rate of credit though the credit growth continued to 
outpace that of the banking sector. Bank credit to NBFCs 
accelerated as did the reliance of NBFCs on bank credit 
as a source of funding. This could pose risks for NBFCs if 
banks are not in a position or unwilling to extend credit 
to the sector (Chart 3.27).
3.26 The fi nancial soundness indicators of systemically 
important non-deposit taking NBFCs (NBFC-ND-SIs) 
revealed a deteriorating trend with respect to soundness, 
asset quality and profi tability (in terms of RoA). The 
CRAR remained above the regulatory requirement of 
15 per cent, though it declined over the review period, 
Chart 3.25 : Positive and Negative MTM as a Ratio of Capital Funds 
for Sample of Banks
Source : Banks in the Sample
Chart 3.26 : Net MTM as a Ratio of Capital Funds for
Sample of Banks
Source : Banks in the Sample
7 Sample consists of 26 banks accounting for 88 per cent of total notional amount of derivatives exposure and 64 per cent of total assets of SCBs as on 
March 31, 2012.
Chart 3.27 : Credit Growth – NBFCs vis-à-vis Banks
Source : RBI Supervisory Returns
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Chart 3.30 : Change in Net MTM–Scenario Analysis
Note: Based on Worst Case Analysis (the maximum impact on the net MTM positions amongst the scenario/sensitivity stress tests respectively).
Source: Banks in the Sample
Box 3.2 : Stress Testing of Derivatives Portfolio of Select Banks
A stress testing exercise on derivatives portfolio of 
a cross section of banks was undertaken. The stress 
tests consisted of six historical scenarios and four 
interest rate and exchange rate sensitivity shocks8.
The impact of the tests exhibited considerable 
variance across banks and across bank groups. In 
terms of increase in negative MTM, foreign banks 
were impacted signifi cantly while the impact on 
the rest of the bank groups was muted. Further, 
the shocks used for sensitivity analysis caused the 
maximum stress, in case of most banks, relative to 
the historical scenarios (Charts 3.28 and 3.29).
Chart 3.28 : Negative MTM Post-Stress (Scenario) as Ratio of 
Capital Funds
Note: Each line represents an individual bank in the sample set
Source: Banks in the Sample
Chart 3.29 : Negative MTM Post-Stress (Sensitivity) as Ratio of 
Capital Funds
The impact on the net MTM positions of banks in 
the sample, post application of the stress conditions, 
was observed to be relatively muted in most cases. 
The shocks used for sensitivity analysis caused 
the maximum stress for most banks relative to 
the historical scenarios with the average change in
Net MTM being around 344 per cent for the 
sensitivity analysis compared with 66 per cent 
for scenario analysis. However, there were a few 
outlier banks where the impact was signifi cant and 
these banks would need to carefully manage the 
underlying risks (Charts 3.30 and 3.31).
8 For methodology and details, please refer to the Annex.
Chart 3.31 : Change in Net MTM–Sensitivity Analysis
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(Chart 3.32). The downward movement in CRAR could 
partially be explained by the increasing asset base of the 
NBFCs. Further, the RoA remained healthy at around
2 per cent.
Rapid rise of gold loan companies could be a cause 
of concern
3.27 The exponential growth in balance sheets of 
NBFCs engaged in lending against gold in recent years 
9  NBFCs which are predominantly engaged in extending loans against gold jewellery are also known as ‘gold loan companies’.
Chart 3.32 : Financial Soundness Indicators of NBFC-ND-SIs
Source : RBI Supervisory Returns
coupled with the rapid rise in gold prices along with 
expansion in the number of their branches could be a 
cause of concern (Box 3.3). The gold loan companies9 
exhibited high dependency on the banking system for 
their resources which could pose risks to the banks, in 
case the business model of these companies falters. This 
growing interconnectedness of gold loan companies 
with banks was sought to be addressed through recent 
regulatory measures viz., the de-recognition of priority 
Lending against the collateral of gold is not a recent 
phenomenon, though there has been a spurt in this activity in 
recent years with NBFCs emerging as prominent players in the 
market for ‘gold loans’. The share of NBFCs in total gold loans 
extended by all fi nancial institutions, showed a marked increase 
between March 2010 and 2011. Individuals are the largest 
borrowers against gold from NBFCs and account for 95 per cent 
of the total gold loans.
The data related to these NBFCs shows that the total asset size 
increased sharply from ` 54.8 billion as at end March 2009 to 
` 445.1 billion as at end March 31, 2012. The growth has largely 
been accompanied by an escalation in borrowings. There is 
signifi cant concentration among the companies, as the growth 
in advances is mainly contributed by two companies. The 
borrowings of these two companies increased by nearly 
200 per cent between March 2010 and 2011.
Nevertheless, there are several concerns pertaining to this 
segment of the NBFC sector. The main concerns being:
(i) Concentration Risk
 With more than 90 per cent of the loan assets being 
collateralised by only one product viz. gold jewellery, the 
business model of gold loan companies has inherent 
concentration risks. The risks, however, would materialise 
only in case of a steep adverse movement in gold prices.
(ii) Operational Risk
 The gold loan companies thrive on the promises of 
disbursement of quick /easy loan. Considering the extremely 
speedy disbursal being promised by these companies, 
quality of due diligence including adherence to Know Your 
Customer (KYC) norms, establishing ownership and quality 
of the gold, etc. could be compromised.
(iii) Concerns on Private Placement of NCDs on a Retail Basis
 The gold loan companies have resorted to frequent 
issuances of short term retail non convertible debentures 
(NCDs), especially through private placement for meeting 
their credit needs. Concerns arise as some of these NCDs 
carry the features of ‘public deposits’, but these entities 
are not regulated in a manner akin to deposit taking NBFCs.
(iv) Reliance on borrowings, especially bank funds
 The business model of the gold loan companies is driven 
by borrowings, of which, bank fi nance forms the major 
component and is increasing at a fast rate. Any adverse 
development in recovery by these NBFCs or an adverse 
movement in gold prices may have a spill-over impact on 
the asset quality of the banks.
Box 3.3 : Gold Loan Companies and Associated Risks
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sector status of bank fi nance to NBFCs for on-lending 
against gold jewellery and through the prescription of a 
lower exposure limits on bank fi nance to NBFCs. Further, 
as a prudential measure, the Reserve Bank also directed 
the gold loan companies to maintain a minimum Loan-
to-Value (LTV) ratio of 60 per cent for loans granted 
against the collateral of gold jewellery and a minimum 
Tier I capital of 12 per cent by April 1, 2014.
Urban Co-operative Banks (UCBs)
UCBs show improvement in performance
3.28 The performance of Scheduled UCBs (SUCBs) as 
at end March 2012 has shown improvement during the 
review period (Chart 3.33).
Regional Rural Banks (RRBs)
Strain in asset quality evident
3.29 RRBs, which constituted about 1.5 per cent of the 
assets of the fi nancial system, showed robust growth as 
at end March 2012, even as asset quality deteriorated 
(Charts 3.34 and 3.35).
Insurance Sector10
Non life sector indicated robust growth while life 
sector declined
3.30 The non life insurance industry grew by 
23.2 per cent, at end March 2012, as against a growth of 
22.4 per cent as at end March 2011. The life insurance 
Chart 3.34 : Growth of Select Balance Sheet Components of
RRBs – March 2012
Note: Data for March 2012 are provisional
Source : RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 3.35 : Gross NPA Ratio of RRBs
Source : RBI Supervisory Returns
10 Source : Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA).
Chart 3.33 : Financial Soundness Indicators of Scheduled UCBs
Note: Data for March 2012 are provisional
Source : RBI Supervisory Returns
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industry showed a decline of 9.2 per cent in the fi rst 
year premium collected in 2011-12, against a growth of 
15.1 per cent in 2010-11.
Challenges lie ahead in wake of Solvency II regime
3.31 The Indian insurance sector is governed by a 
factor based solvency regime which is comparable to
Solvency I11. This framework is rule based and refl ects 
various risks at the industry level while implicit margins 
embedded in various elements for valuing assets, 
liabilities and solvency margins make the solvency 
framework prudent and robust.
3.32 Solvency II is a risk-based regulatory regime that 
will apply to almost all insurance establishments in the 
European Union (EU). The regime introduces economic 
risk-based solvency requirements and aims to bring in a 
change in perception that capital is not the only mitigant 
against failures. Instead of statutory provisioning, 
Solvency II provides for provisioning based on the 
(market consistent) ‘Best Estimate’. Given that the joint 
venture partners of a number of insurance companies 
operating in India are EU based entities, the Indian 
operations have also been assessed for the purpose of 
Solvency II. While the level of preparedness of these 
entities would be much higher, greater challenges exist 
with respect to the public sector insurers both in the 
life and non-life segments.
3.33 The current capital regime in India is not in 
complete consonance with Solvency II and embarking on 
the framework would necessitate addressing a range of 
challenges in terms of assessment of risks, development 
of internal models, adequacy of data, capacity building 
both within IRDA and in the insurance industry. As a 
fi rst step in this direction, IRDA has set up a Committee 
to examine the solvency regime in select jurisdictions 
and to make its recommendations on the Solvency II 
regime in India.
Pension Funds12
3.34 India’s pension ecosystem is enormous and is 
growing rapidly. At one end of the spectrum are Defi ned 
Benefi t (DB) pension schemes of which the two main 
schemes are the pre-reform civil services pension 
11 Solvency I is the name given to changes to the EU’s insurer solvency regime made in 2002. The changes aimed to establish a common prudential 
framework for insurance undertakings in EU based on the concept of minimum harmonisation and mutual recognition.
12  Source: Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority (PFRDA).
scheme of the Centre/states (which has been replaced 
by the National Pension System for the new recruits) 
and the ‘organised sector’ social security scheme 
operationalised by the Employees’ Provident Fund 
Organisation (EPFO). Besides, in the defi ned benefi t 
category, there are a number of schemes which are run 
by the central and state governments, of which the 
largest is the Indira Gandhi National Old Age Pension 
Scheme. The state governments run a number of 
occupational pension schemes, a large number of which, 
relate to the trades in the unorganised sector and mainly 
target the population below the poverty line.
3.35 At the other end of the spectrum are the Defi ned 
Contribution (DC) Schemes of which the National 
Pension System (NPS) introduced from January 2004 is 
the most important addition to the Indian pension 
sector. The NPS was initially introduced as a replacement 
pension scheme for the civil services. The scheme was 
fi rst adopted by the central government and then by the 
state governments, except for West Bengal, Kerala and 
Tripura. In 2009, the NPS was extended to the private 
sector and, in 2010, the Government of India introduced 
a co-contribution scheme (called ‘Swavalamban’) on the 
NPS platform for the unorganised sector. The DC space 
is also populated by a number of schemes that are run 
by insurance companies for private individuals and 
corporates.
3.36 In the case of the DB schemes, the biggest 
challenge is the quantifi cation of the liabilities. Since 
the pre-2004 pension scheme is indexed to infl ation and 
wage increases recommended by the Pay Commission, 
it becomes diffi cult to project the pay-outs far into the 
future. The problem is compounded by the fact that it 
is a ‘Pay As You Go’ system which implies that this is an 
unfunded liability. Any large increase in the pension 
liability will have a direct impact on the fi scal defi cit. The 
2012-13 budget estimated a total outfl ow of ` 631 billion 
on pensions and retirement benefits of central 
government employees alone, which is an increase of 
12 per cent over the revised estimate of `561 billion in 
2011-12. In the 1970s and 1980s, recruitment by the 
Government expanded rapidly, though it was contained 
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in the 1990s. Pension payments to the recruits of earlier 
decades will soon start looming large. The outfl ows are 
expected to rise as the cohort of recruits between 1970s 
and 1980s retire. In the case of the EPFO, it is a DB 
scheme which is partially funded by the contributions 
made by the employer and the employee. However, since 
the benefi ts are fi xed and are sticky downwards, any 
shortfal l  wil l  have to be made good by the 
Government. According to the Report of the Expert 
Committee on Employees’ Pension Scheme (EPS), 199513, 
there is underfunding in the EPS at the present rate of 
contributions and sustainability of the scheme would 
require upward revisions. Moreover, the Employees’ 
Pension Fund had a corpus of about `1420 billion as on 
March 31, 2011. The large magnitude is a pointer to 
systemic risk, if magnitude is any criteria. In the case of 
several DB schemes, currently under implementation 
and newly announced, the lack of liability computation 
especially in a world of rising life expectancy can be a 
potential source of fi scal stress in years where there are 
large payouts.
3.37 Identifying systemic risks for DC pension systems 
is a challenge as prima-facie, one does not fi nd reasons 
when all the risks are transferred and diffused to a large 
number of subscribers whose benefi ts are left undefi ned, 
by defi nition. The task becomes more challenging when 
the pension regulator has a limited mandate to regulate 
only the National Pension System and no identifi cation 
methodology for systemic risks is available and 
implemented. The miniscule size of NPS intuitively 
renders negligible possibilities or potentials of posing 
any systemic risk. The NPS (a Defi ned Contribution-
unprotected), by defi nition, rules out the requirement 
of solvency or capital requirement related stress test. At 
best, some kind of scenario analysis can be contemplated, 
not from the perspective of systemic risk threat but for 
effectively addressing public disclosure risk issues. This 
is specifically relevant for the return and benefit 
projection on which illustrations could be based. A 
sensitivity testing could also be relevant when the risk 
of a particular factor is tested on an institution or 
portfolio (such as equity market decline or adverse 
interest rate movements). Similarly a full range of stress 
13  www.epfi ndia.com/Circulars/Y2011-12/EPS95_Expert_Report.pdf
tests covering broad range of modeling techniques can 
be contemplated to effectively communicate the risks 
passed on to the subscribers using historical scenarios 
or hypothetical (usually extreme) events. The modeling 
can be deterministic or stochastic.
3.38 International standard setting organisations such 
as International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
(IAIS) and Bank for International Settlements (BIS) have 
outlined two main roles for stress testing: (a) To ascertain 
whether fi nancial institutions have suffi cient fi nancial 
resources to meet their commitments (not required for 
DC pensions which do not have set liabilities to meet) 
(b) As a general risk management tool, which can be 
used to ascertain the impact of various factors or 
scenarios on fi nancial institutions (DC pensions do not 
have capital requirements).
3.39 However, stress tests can help to develop and 
assess alternative strategies for mitigating risks. There 
could be three different uses of stress tests. First, the 
pension supervisor can analyse the results of tests 
undertaken by pension funds as a part of general 
oversight. Second, supervisors can impose standard tests 
for all supervised entities for comparative purposes or 
to establish the state of the industry as a whole. Third, 
supervisor could optionally request particular tests to 
be imposed on specifi c institutions where they have 
concerns. At present, internationally, there is no 
guidance available to be drawn from the comparative 
analysis on the elements and factors that should be 
considered by both pension funds and pension 
supervisors in designing, applying and evaluating stress 
testing models.
3.40 Similar to the rigorous exercises undertaken by 
the Expert Committee, the conventional broad range of 
modeling techniques and solvency related tests can be 
applied to these DB pension plans to ensure that 
government has suffi cient fi nancial resources to meet 
their (future) commitments. Stress tests with respect to 
particular risk factors (such as general economic decline, 
interest rate movements, infl ation) can help to develop 
and assess alternative strategies for mitigating risk.
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Chart 3.36 : Credit Risk : Gross Credit- Distribution of
Stressed CRAR of Banks
Source : Supervisory Data and RBI staff calculations
Table 3.3 : Credit Risk: Gross Credit - Impact on Capital and NPAs
(Except number of banks, fi gures are in per cent)
System Level Impacted Banks 
(CRAR < 9%)
Impacted Banks
(Core CRAR < 6%)
CRAR Core 
CRAR
NPA 
Ratio
Number 
of Banks
Share in 
Total 
Assets
Number 
of Banks
Share 
in Total 
Assets
Baseline:
All Banks 14.1 10.3 2.9 – – – –
Select 60 
Banks
13.9 10.1 2.8 – – – –
Shock 1: 11.9 7.9 5.8 5 6.7 11 30.0
Shock 2: 11.1 7.2 7.2 12 30.2 18 41.9
Shock 3: 12.7 8.8 4.2 3 1.5 4 6.5
Shock 1: NPAs increase by 100 per cent
Shock 2: NPAs increase by 150 per cent
Shock 3: NPAs increase due to 40 per cent of restructured standard advances 
turning NPAs
Source: Supervisory Data and RBI staff calculations
14  For methodology and details, please refer to the Annex.
15  The results of the macro stress tests are discussed in Chapter V of this Report.
Resilience of Financial Institutions
3.41 The resilience of the fi nancial institutions was 
assessed through a series of stress tests which imparted 
extreme but plausible shocks14 based on supervisory data 
pertaining to end-March 2012. The resilience of SCBs to 
various stress scenarios was tested using both the top 
down and the bottom up approaches as also through a 
series of macro stress tests15. A number of single factor 
sensitivity stress tests were also carried out on scheduled 
UCBs and NBFC-ND-SIs (Non deposit taking systemically 
important NBFCs) to assess their vulnerabilities and 
resilience under various scenarios.
Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs)
3.42 A series of top down stress tests incorporating 
credit, foreign exchange, equity, interest rate and 
liquidity risks were carried out for the banking system 
(60 SCBs comprising 99 per cent of total banking sector 
assets). The same set of shocks were used by 25 select 
SCBs (comprising about 75 per cent of total assets) to 
conduct bottom up stress tests. The bottom up stress 
tests broadly refl ected the results of the top down stress 
tests and reconfi rmed the resilience of the banking 
system to a wide range of shocks.
Credit risk remains the main source of vulnerability 
for SCBs
3.43 The impact of shocks under different credit 
risk scenarios for banks as on March 2012 shows that 
the system level CRAR remained above the required 
minimum of 9 per cent and the system is reasonably 
poised to withstand the shocks; although some banks, 
including a few large banks, could be under stress as 
their CRAR would fall below 9 per cent (Table 3.3 and 
Chart 3.36).
Banks remain resilient to sectoral credit risk shocks
3.44 The analysis of a credit risk shock emanating 
from important sectors viz. agriculture, power, real 
estate, telecom and priority sector revealed that the 
maximum impact was seen in the case of shocks to the 
priority sector followed by shocks to the real estate and 
agriculture sectors. The banks were, however, able to 
absorb the shocks (Table 3.4).
Table 3.4 : Credit Risk: Sectoral – Impact on Capital and NPAs
 (Per cent)
System Level
CRAR Core CRAR NPA Ratio
Baseline:
All Banks 14.1 10.3 2.9
Select 60 Banks 13.9 10.1 2.8
Shock: 5 percentage points increase in NPAs in each sector
Power 13.7 9.8 3.2
Telecommunication 13.8 10.0 3.0
Agriculture 13.4 9.6 3.5
Real Estate 13.3 9.4 3.7
All 4 Sectors : Agriculture + Power + 
Real Estate + Telecom
12.6 8.8 4.7
Priority Sector 12.8 8.9 4.4
Source: Supervisory Data and RBI staff calculations
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Table 3.6 : Interest Rate Risk: Banking Book-Impact on Banks
 (Except number of banks, fi gures are in per cent)
System Level Impacted Banks 
(CRAR < 9%)
Impacted Banks 
(Core CRAR < 6%)
CRAR Core 
CRAR
Number of 
Banks
Share in 
Total 
Assets
Number of 
Banks
Share in 
Total 
Assets
Baseline:
All Banks 14.1 10.3 – – – –
Select 50 
Banks 13.9 10.1 – – – –
Net Impact on Banking Book (Earnings + Portfolio)
Shock 1 10.9 7.1 16 25.9 18 41.3
Shock 2 13.9 10.1 0 0.0 0 0.0
Shock 3 13.4 9.6 0 0.0 0 0.0
Shock 4 12.0 8.3 3 3.4 7 10.5
Income Impact on Banking Book (Earnings)
Shock 1 13.8 10.0 1 1.8 1 1.8
Shock 2 13.9 10.1 0 0.0 0 0.0
Shock 3 13.8 10.1 0 0.0 0 0.0
Shock 4 13.8 10.0 1 1.8 1 1.8
Valuation Impact on Banking Book (Duration Gap Analysis)
Shock 1 11.0 7.2 14 23.1 17 40.2
Shock 2 13.9 10.1 0 0.0 0 0.0
Shock 3 13.4 9.7 0 0.0 0 0.0
Shock 4 12.1 8.4 2 1.5 7 10.2
Shock 1: Parallel upward shift in INR yield curve by 250 bps
Shock 2: Parallel downward shift by 250 bps
Shock 3: Steepening of the INR yield curve, with interest rates increasing by 100 
bps linearly spread between 1-month maturity and more than 10 year 
maturity
Shock 4: Inversion of the INR yield curve with one-year rates shifting upwards 
linearly by 250 bps and 10-year rates dropping by 100 bps
Source: Supervisory Data and RBI staff calculations
16 The stress tests have been carried out on the assumption that (i) the SLR securities would be available for use during a period of system-wide run 
on deposits and (ii) only excess SLR securities are liquid. Five different defi nitions of liquid assets have been used involving different combinations of 
cash, CRR, Inter-bank-deposits and Investments.
Table 3.5 : Credit Risk: Concentration- Impact on Capital and NPAs
(Except number of banks, fi gures are in per cent)
System Level Impacted Banks 
(CRAR < 9%)
Impacted Banks 
(Core CRAR < 6%)
CRAR Core 
CRAR
NPA 
Ratio
Number 
of Banks
Share in 
Total 
Assets
Number 
of Banks
Share 
in Total 
Assets
Baseline:
All Banks 14.1 10.3 2.9 - - - -
Select 60 
Banks
13.9 10.1 2.8 - - - -
Shock 1 12.7 8.8 5.6 1 0.19 1 3.0
Shock 2 12.2 8.3 7.8 1 0.19 2 5.1
Shock 3 11.6 7.7 10.6 1 0.19 9 30.4
Shock 4 12.3 8.4 7.5 1 0.19 2 5.1
Shock 1: Top individual borrower defaults
Shock 2:  Top two individual borrowers default
Shock 3:  Top three individual borrowers default
Shock 4:  Top group borrower defaults 
Source: Supervisory Data and RBI staff calculations
Credit concentration risk was not signifi cant
3.45 A study of the concentration of credit portfolio 
of banks revealed that, at the system level, the 
concentration appeared moderate, though the degree 
of concentration was higher in some individual banks 
(Table 3.5). The average exposure of the banks to the 
largest group borrower stood at 4.7 per cent of total 
advances. The maximum exposure was, however, much 
higher at 26.1 per cent.
Banks able to withstand interest rate shocks
3.46 The resilience of SCBs to shocks involving both 
parallel and non-parallel shifts in the yield curve was 
assessed. The tests were carried out separately for the 
banking and trading books. The results carried out on the 
trading book suggest that the impact of interest rate risk 
would be limited and no bank is impacted adversely. The 
results of the banking book also suggest that the banking 
system could withstand the assumed stressed scenarios, 
though the CRAR of some individual banks slip below 
the regulatory minimum. The impact is maximum in 
case of a parallel upward shift of the INR yield curve by 
250 basis points (bps) (Table 3.6 and Chart 3.37).
Impact of adverse exchange rate and equity price 
movements would be limited
3.47 The impact, of appreciation/depreciation of 
currencies by 10/20 per cent, on banks’ individual net 
open bilateral currency positions was assessed. The 
stress tests results indicate that the impact will not be 
signifi cant. The impact of a fall in the equity prices by 40 
per cent on banks’ capital revealed that the shock has a 
marginal impact as the equity market exposure of banks 
was not very signifi cant. The system level CRAR fell to 
13.4 per cent, under stress, from the baseline of 14.1 
per cent. For all banks, the post-stress CRAR remained 
above 9 per cent.
SLR investments key in mitigating liquidity risks
3.48 Stress scenarios assessing the resilience of banks 
to liquidity risk16 evidenced deterioration in the liquidity 
position of some banks. The availability of Statutory 
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Liquidity Ratio (SLR) investments, however, helped the 
banks to ward off the liquidity pressure (Table 3.7).
Bottom-up stress tests also refl ect resilience of the 
banking system
3.49 The results of the bottom up stress tests carried 
out by select banks (paragraph 3.42) also testifi ed to the 
general resilience of the banks to the different kinds 
of sensitivity analysis. As in the case of the top down 
stress tests, the impact of the stress tests were relatively 
more severe on some banks with their post-stress 
CRAR position falling below the regulatory minimum 
(Chart 3.38).
Chart 3.37 : Interest Rate Risk - Banking Book-Distribution of 
Stressed CRAR of Banks
Source : Supervisory Data and RBI staff calculations
Table 3.7 : Liquidity Risk: Impact on Banks
(Except number of banks, fi gures are in per cent)
Liquid Assets Defi nition Banks Facing Defi cit Liquid 
Assets 
Ratio
No. of 
Banks
Deposits 
Share
Assets 
Share
Baseline: 1 Cash, Excess CRR, Inter-bank-deposits, All-SLR-Investments 22.9
Shock 1: 10 per cent total deposit 
withdrawal 30 days
0 0.0 0.0 14.2
Shock 2: 3 per cent deposit withdrawal 
each day for 5 days
0 0.0 0.0 11.0
Baseline: 2 Cash, Excess CRR, Inter-bank-deposits-maturing-within-
1-month and Investments-maturing-within-1-month
7.4
Shock 1: 10 per cent total deposit 
withdrawal 30 days
40 85.4 81.2 -2.8
Shock 2: 3 per cent deposit withdrawal 
each day for 5 days
44 90.7 87.0 -6.7
Baseline: 3 Cash, Excess CRR, Inter-bank-deposits-maturing-within-
1-month, Excess SLR
3.1
Shock 1: 10 per cent total deposit 
withdrawal 30 days
57 99.9 99.6 -7.7
Shock 2: 3 per cent deposit withdrawal 
each day for 5 days
57 99.9 99.6 -11.8
Baseline: 4 Cash, CRR, Inter-bank-1mon, Inv-1mon 11.2
Shock 1: 10 per cent total deposit 
withdrawal 30 days
26 59.9 56.8 1.3
Shock 2: 3 per cent deposit withdrawal 
each day for 5 days
36 77.8 73.3 -2.4
Baseline: 5 Cash, CRR, Inter-bank-1mon, Excess SLR 6.8
Shock 1: 10 per cent total deposit 
withdrawal 30 days
54 99.5 98.9 -3.5
Shock 2: 3 per cent deposit withdrawal 
each day for 5 days
57 99.9 99.6 -7.4
Source: Supervisory Returns and RBI staff calculations
Chart 3.38 : Bottom-Up Stress Testing: Distribution of Stressed CRAR of Select Banks
Credit Risk NPAs increase by 150 per cent
Sectoral Risk 5 percentage points increase in NPAs in 
each sector (Agriculture + Power + Real 
Estate + Telecom)
Concentration Risk The top three individual borrowers 
default
Interest Rate Risk – Banking Book 
(IRR-BB)
Parallel upward shift in INR yield curve by 
250 bps
Interest Rate Risk – Trading Book 
(IRR-TB)
Parallel upward shift in INR yield curve by 
250 bps
Foreign Exchange (FX) Risk INR depreciates against all currencies by 
20 per cent
Equity Price Risk Fall in the equity prices by 40 per cent
Source: Select banks
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Urban Co-operative Banks
UCBs vulnerable to credit risk shocks…
3.50 Stress tests on credit risk were carried out for 
Scheduled UCBs (SUCBs) using their balance sheet data 
as at end-March 2012. The impact of credit risk shocks on 
the CRAR of the banks was assessed under two different 
scenarios assuming an increase in the gross NPA ratio 
by 50 per cent and 100 per cent respectively. The results 
show that SUCBs could withstand shocks assumed under 
the fi rst scenario easily, though it would come under 
some stress under the second scenario (Chart 3.39).
…as also to liquidity risks
3.51 Stress tests on liquidity risk were carried out 
under two different scenarios assuming an increase in 
cash outfl ows in the 1 to 28 days time bucket by 50 per 
cent and 100 per cent respectively. It was assumed that 
there were no changes in cash infl ows under both the 
scenarios. The banks were considered to be impacted 
if, as a result of the stress, the mismatch or negative 
gap (i.e. the cash infl ow less cash outfl ow) in the 1 to 
28 days time bucket exceeded 20 per cent of outfl ows. 
The stress test results indicate that the SUCBs would be 
signifi cantly impacted even under the less severe stress 
scenario (Chart 3.40).
Non-Banking Financial Companies
NBFCs able to withstand credit risk shocks 
3.52 A stress test on credit risk for NBFC-ND-SI sector 
for the period ended December 2011 was carried out 
under two scenarios assuming an increase in gross NPA 
by 200 per cent and 500 per cent respectively.
3.53 It was observed that, in the fi rst scenario, CRAR 
reduced marginally from 27.5 to 26.8 per cent, while 
in the second scenario CRAR reduced to 24.3 per cent. 
Chart 3.39 : Impact of Shocks on Capital Position: SUCBs – Mar 2012
Note : Data for March 2012 are provisional
Source: Supervisory Data and RBI staff calculations
Chart 3.40 : Impact of Liquidity Risk Shocks: SUCBs – Mar 2012
Note : Data for March 2012 are provisional
Source: Supervisory Data and RBI staff calculations
The sector, thus, remained resilient even to the more 
severe stress scenario owing largely to its comfortable 
CRAR position. However, the CRAR of some individual 
NBFCs (accounting for around 5 per cent of total assets of 
NBFC-ND-SIs), fell to below the regulatory requirement 
of 15 per cent.
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Chapter IV
Financial Sector Regulation and Infrastructure
The fi nancial sector reform measures initiated in the aftermath of the global fi nancial crisis are being 
implemented by many countries, with the pace and extent of reforms varying across countries and markets. 
The standard setting bodies have come out with fi nal recommendations for policy reforms, and these need to 
be implemented after extensive study and debate to ensure that adverse impact of unintended consequences do 
not outweigh the intended benefi ts. In the Indian context, fi nal guidelines with respect to Basel III have been 
issued and a discussion paper on dynamic provisioning has been released. The unfi nished agenda includes 
convergence with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), strengthening the oversight mechanism 
of the non-banking fi nancial sector, reforms in the Over the Counter (OTC) derivatives market and improving 
the resolution framework for fi nancial institutions. The payment and settlement system in the country continues 
to be robust, with increasing use of electronic modes of settlement. Certain concerns, viz., settlement lags in 
the RTGS System and large uncollateralised intra-day exposures to settlement banks being assumed by the 
Clearing Corporation of India Limited (CCIL) need to be addressed. Safety net arrangements have functioned 
smoothly, but issues relating to the adequacy and resilience of the deposit insurance fund remain.
Global regulatory reforms gathering pace, but 
implementation challenges will need to be addressed
4.1 International initiatives, started after the global 
fi nancial crisis, have gathered momentum and the policy 
framework for the reforms has crystalised. However, 
several implementation challenges are emerging.
4.2 Several countries have announced their respective 
national policy frameworks for migration to Basel III 
leading to concerns about cross border consistency. Gaps 
in implementation are also emerging, for instance, with 
respect to putting in place resolution frameworks for 
systemically important fi nancial institutions (SIFIs) and 
reforms in the OTC derivatives markets. Unintended 
consequences of the reform measures might pose 
challenges, especially to emerging markets such as India, 
which will need to be carefully monitored. One set of 
concerns relate to the potential deleveraging induced by 
the new capital and liquidity standards, affecting trade 
credit, infrastructure and project finance, etc. to 
emerging markets. There may not be a market in 
emerging economies for certain capital instruments, e.g. 
contingent capital instruments, which are being 
proposed under Basel III. There are also concerns about 
the availability of a suffi cient quantum of ‘liquid’ assets 
prescribed under the Basel III liquidity norms and the 
impact of such requirements on domestic fi nancial 
markets.
Guidelines refl ecting the new international standards 
have been issued
4.3 The Reserve Bank, on May 2, 2012, issued fi nal 
guidelines on Basel III. The implementation of Basel III 
capital requirements will begin on January 1, 2013. The 
norms will be fully implemented by March 31, 20181. 
Under the new standards, banks will have to
  maintain total capital of at least 9 per cent, 
tier 1 capital of 7 per cent and common equity 
tier 1 (CET1) of 5.5 per cent of risk weighted 
assets (RWAs) respectively;
  create a capital conservation buffer in the 
form of common equity at 2.5 per cent of 
RWAs. The implementation of the capital 
conservation buffer will start from March 31, 
2015.
1 Implementation has been advanced by nine months to make full implementation co-terminus with the fi nancial closure of banks on March 31 of 
every year.
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4.4  As a prudential measure, the existing capital 
adequacy requirement in India is one per cent higher 
than the minimum prescribed by the Basel Committee, 
and the higher requirement will continue under Basel 
III. A more stringent leverage ratio has also been 
prescribed based on the fact that most Indian banks have 
a relatively comfortable leverage position, much more 
than the minimum of 3 per cent proposed by the Basel 
Committee. During the period of parallel run, banks 
should strive to maintain their existing level of leverage 
ratio but, in no case the leverage ratio should fall below 
4.5 per cent. A bank whose leverage ratio is below 4.5 
per cent may endeavour to bring it above 4.5 per cent 
as early as possible. Final leverage ratio requirements 
will be prescribed by the Reserve Bank after the parallel 
run, taking into account the prescriptions given by the 
Basel Committee.
4.5  The implementation of Basel III proposals are 
expected to be far reaching. For emerging economies like 
India, the implementation comes at a time when credit 
demand is expected to pick up, given the compulsions 
of growth; the investment needs of infrastructure; and 
the demand ushered in by increasing fi nancial inclusion. 
Simultaneously meeting the requirements of additional 
capital buffers and the growing credit needs of the 
economy may pose challenges. As the additional capital 
requirements, both equity and non-equity, are likely to 
increase over the period of full implementation of Basel 
III, this could put pressure on capital markets, increase 
the cost of capital and reduce return on equity, in the 
short-term for the banking system. The fi scal impact of 
the increased capital requirements of public sector banks 
has also to be reckoned with. However, in the medium 
to long term, the measures are expected to yield net 
benefi t to the banking system and to the economy at 
large. Also, the comfortable capital adequacy position of 
banks in India (CRAR at over 14 per cent and core CRAR 
at over 10 per cent as on March 31, 2012) under Basel II 
implies that banks will migrate to the Basel III 
requirements from a position of relative strength. The 
e xtended t rans i t ional  a r rangement  for  fu l l 
implementation of Basel III provides suffi cient time to 
banks to carefully assess and raise the capital required.
4.6  The case for prescribing forward looking 
provisions for credit risk for Indian banks was 
highlighted in the previous FSR. The Reserve Bank has 
since issued draft guidelines on dynamic provisioning2. 
The dynamic provision created during a year has been 
quantifi ed as the difference between long run average 
expected loss (EL) of the portfolio for one year and the 
incremental specifi c provisions made during the year 
(Box 4.1).
Progress in convergence with IFRS has been tardy
4.7 Challenges to the IFRS convergence of the banking 
sector arise from a lack of clarity about the convergence 
schedule domestically, as also from the uncertainity in 
the finalisation of IFRS 9 relating to Financial 
Instruments. The uncertainties with respect to IFRS 9 
arise, on account of delays in fi nalising the proposals 
relating to impairment and hedge accounting by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) coupled 
with recent proposals by IASB to reopen previously 
fi nalised requirements relating to classifi cation and 
measurement of fi nancial assets. There are also some 
major technical issues arising for Indian banks in the 
course of convergence. Differences between the IFRS 
and current regulatory guidelines on classifi cation and 
measurement of fi nancial assets, focus in the standard 
on the business model followed by banks and the 
challenges for management in this area, lack of adequate 
number of skilled staff and modifi cations to IT systems 
and processes are some of the other challenges that may 
need to be tackled in due course. As discussed in 
previous FSRs, a Working Group constituted by the 
Reserve Bank is examining the implementation issues. 
The existing resolution regime in the country may 
need a revamp
4.8  The extant rules for resolution do not meet all 
the requirements of the Key Attributes of Effective 
Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions adopted 
by the Financial Stability Board (FSB)3. In India, there is 
no explicit governance arrangement for resolution in 
the form of legal and institutional structures. At present, 
resolution of a bank is attempted under the Banking 
2 RBI Discussion paper on “Introduction of Dynamic Provisioning Framework for Bank in India”, March 30, 2012 (http://rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_
PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=26219)
3 http://www.fi nancialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104cc.pdf
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Regulation (BR) Act, 1949, through compulsory or 
voluntary mergers. One of the fundamental objectives 
of any resolution attempt is to protect the interests of 
the depositors. However, in the case of compulsory 
amalgamation under section 45 of the BR Act, 1949, 
shareholders are not completely precluded from getting 
compensation.
4.9 In order to examine the gaps in the extant 
resolution regime for fi nancial institutions in India vis-
à-vis the ‘key attributes’ and to suggest the nature and 
extent of the legislative and regulatory changes needed 
to address such gaps, a Working Group has been 
constituted in the Reserve Bank. The Sub Committee of 
the Financial Stability and Development Council (FSDC) 
is also deliberating on the issue.
Differences in RWA density could be accentuated as 
banks migrate to the Basel II advanced approaches
4.10  From a stability perspective, migration of banks, 
particularly large banks with international presence, to 
the advanced approaches under Basel II is desirable. 
When the banks migrate to these approaches, trends in 
RWAs will need to be monitored.
Indian banks make four types of loan loss provisions at present, 
viz., (a) general provisions for standard assets; (b) specifi c 
provisions for non performing assets (NPAs); (c) fl oating 
provisions; and (d) provisions against the diminution in the 
fair value of a restructured asset. The present provisioning 
policy was found to have the following drawbacks, (i) the 
rate of standard asset provisions has not been determined 
based on any scientifi c analysis or the credit loss history of 
banks; (ii) banks make fl oating provisions at their discretion 
without any pre-determined rules and not all banks make 
fl oating provisions; (iii) though the Reserve Bank has been 
following a policy of countercyclical variation of standard 
asset provisioning rates, the methodology has been largely 
based on current available data and judgement, rather than 
on an analysis of credit cycles and loss history, and hence the 
provisioning framework does not have countercyclical or cycle 
smoothening elements.
Advances in credit risk modeling over the last decade or so 
have introduced the concept of expected losses (EL) and 
unexpected losses (UL) to measure potential losses in a 
credit portfolio. It is generally accepted that banks should 
cover the unexpected losses by capital and expected losses 
by provisions. The EL is generally derived as the mean 
of the credit loss distribution. EL-based provisioning has 
forward-looking elements as it is capable of incorporating a 
through-the-cycle view of the probability of default. The Basel 
Committee also supports an EL approach that captures actual 
losses more transparently and is also less procyclical than the 
current ‘incurred loss’ approach.
The objective of the dynamic provisioning framework is to 
smoothen the impact of incurred losses on profi ts through 
the cycle, and not to provide general provisioning cushion 
for expected losses. The proposed dynamic provisioning 
framework in India consists of two components, viz.,
a. Ex-post specifi c provisions (SP) made during a year (which 
will be debited to the profi t and loss account), required as 
per RBI guidelines; and
b. Dynamic provisions (DP) equal to Ct – SP i.e., the 
difference between the long run average expected loss of 
the portfolio for one year and the incremental specifi c 
provisions made during the year ( represents EL and Ct 
represents stock of loans).
It is assumed that when the approach is implemented for the 
fi rst time, the bank will have adequate SP to cover its NPAs. 
Positive value of Ct - SP will increase the credit balance in 
DP Account. A negative value will represent a drawdown from 
the DP Account. This will generally ensure that every year the 
charge to profi t and loss on account of specifi c provisions and 
DP is maintained at a level ofCt.
With respect to the implementation of a dynamic provisioning 
framework, not all banks can be expected to be on the same 
plane. Banks with available capability can introduce a DP 
framework based on the theoretical model, while the other 
banks can follow the standardised method, which is outlined 
in the draft guidelines. Internal estimates based on the data 
obtained from a sample of banks reveal that in terms of impact 
on the profi t and loss of banks, the approach would mean 
taking a total provisioning charge to profi t and loss account 
equivalent to 1.37 per cent of the gross advances annually. 
Supervisory data show that during the period from 2003 to 
2010, average annual charge to profi t and loss on account 
of standard asset provisions and specifi c provisions gross of 
write-offs amounted to 1.04 per cent of gross advances, in the 
range of 0.58 per cent to 1.87 per cent of the gross advances. 
The additional charge is mainly attributed to calibration of  
based on downturn Loss Given Default (LGD).
Box 4.1: Introduction of Dynamic Loan Loss Provisioning Framework for Banks in India
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4.11  Capital ratios are key indicators of a bank’s 
solvency and resilience. RWAs are key to the computation 
of capital ratios of banks with the proportion of RWAs 
to Total Assets (RWA density) serving as an indicator of 
a bank’s riskiness. However, signifi cant differences in 
the RWA density are observed across jurisdictions (Chart 
4.1). Such differences are also observed across banks in 
the same jurisdiction. For the most part, the differences 
in RWA density are risk-based i.e. they reflect the 
differences in the riskiness of the underlying portfolio 
and of the bank’s business mix. Variations also arise due 
to differences in the stage of regulatory evolution – Basel 
I, Basel II, rollout of the advances approaches, etc. and 
use of national discretion in this regard. Concerns, 
however, emerge in respect of the variations which arise 
due to differences in interpretation of the standards and 
lead to practice-based inconsistencies in the calibration 
of risk parameters.
4.12  In the Indian context, credit risk is by far the 
largest component of RWAs representing, on an average, 
71 per cent of total RWAs for the banking sector (Chart 
4.2). There are, however, signifi cant differences in the 
RWA density across banks, though for the scheduled 
commercial banks (SCBs) as a whole, RWA density has 
been increasing over time (Charts 4.3 and 4.4).
…leading to potential diminishing trust in capital 
ratios
4.13  The gradual shift from Basel I to Basel II and to 
the Internal Rating Based approaches has enabled banks 
Chart 4.1: RWA Density across Regions (Per cent)
Source: IMF Working Paper - Revisiting Risk-Weighted Assets “Why Do RWAs Differ 
Across Countries and What Can Be Done About It ?”, March 2012
Chart 4.2: Contribution to RWAs of SCBs
Source : RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 4.3: RWA Density across bank groups – Mar 2012
Source : RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 4.4: RWA Density of SCBs (Per cent)
Source : RBI Supervisory Returns
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to benefi t to some extent from lower RWAs. Perceived 
differences in RWAs within and across countries have, 
however, raised questions about the reliability of RWAs 
and capital ratios.
4.14  The Basel Committee, as part of its comprehensive 
monitoring of the implementation of Basel III, has 
proposed, inter alia, to identify areas of material 
inconsistencies in the calculation of RWAs. The fi ndings 
of the exercise could result in policy recommendations 
to address the identifi ed inconsistencies.
Closer monitoring of banks’ interaction with Non 
Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) and Mutual 
Funds is warranted...
4.15  International efforts at strengthening the 
oversight and regulation of shadow banking activities 
continue. The challenge in regulating this segment is to 
ensure that all signifi cant players are brought under 
regulation, while ensuring that there are no incentives 
to migrate to the less stringently regulated segments. 
The policy reforms are presently focusing on fi ve key 
areas, viz., (a) mitigation of the spill-over effect between 
the regular banking system and the shadow banking 
system; (b) reducing the susceptibility of money market 
funds to ‘runs’; (c) assessing and mitigating systemic 
risks posed by other shadow banking entities; (d) 
assessing and aligning the incentives associated with 
securitisation; and (e) dampening risks and pro-cyclical 
incentives associated with secured fi nancing contracts 
such as repos, and securities lending that may exacerbate 
funding strains in times of ‘runs’4.
... given the interconnectedness between different 
segments of the fi nancial system
4.16 The non banking fi nancial sector in the country 
comprising, inter alia, NBFCs, mutual funds and 
insurance companies, functions within a regulatory 
framework appropriate to the activities undertaken by 
these entities. Nonetheless, a complete macro mapping 
of all kinds of credit intermediation activities would be 
warranted in the light of international reforms in this 
area. Further, there are concerns posed by the degree of 
interconnectedness of these entities with the banking 
system which could pose credit and liquidity risks 
(Chapter V).
4.17  Some concerns are also posed by the degree of 
reliance of the mutual funds sector, especially the Money 
Market Mutual Funds, on institutional investors. In 
times of stress, withdrawal of funds by such investors 
could pose severe liquidity strains, as was observed in 
2008-2009. 
Regulatory gaps being identifi ed and plugged…
4.18  Gaps in the regulation of the non banking 
fi nancial sector are being continuously identifi ed and 
plugged and the oversight mechanism strengthened. 
The need for a regulatory framework for Alternative 
Investment (AI) Funds, which had been flagged in 
previous FSRs, was discussed by FSDC Sub Committee, 
and the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) 
has since put in place a framework for the same. In 
cognition of the risks posed to the banking system on 
account of their exposure to NBFCs extending gold loans, 
exposure limits of banks to NBFCs have been tightened 
while loan to value (LTV) ratios have been prescribed on 
gold loans extended by NBFCs. Similar LTV ratios have 
not been prescribed for the banking system and this 
may necessitate a relook, going forward.
Global initiatives for systemically important insurance 
companies may not affect Indian companies…
4.19  The International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS), in conjunction with FSB, is in the 
process of developing a methodology to assess the 
systemic importance of insurers. The methodology will 
take congisance of the nature of insurance activities and 
the risks posed to the stability of the fi nancial system. 
It is likely to include a range of parameters including 
nature of  operations of  the entity,  i ts  s ize, 
interconnectedness and substitutability, and its global 
activity. The IAIS is in the process of collating and 
analysing data in this regard. The Life Insurance 
Corporation of India participated in the fi rst phase of 
this exercise. However, only some of the indicators being 
considered by the IAIS may be relevant in the Indian 
context given the nature of insurance operations in India 
and the extant regulatory framework. Further, the level 
4 http://www.fi nancialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_111027.pdf
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of global operations of Indian companies is limited and 
their exposure to complex fi nancial products almost 
non-existent.
Potential mis-selling under the Bancassurance model 
will need to be addressed
4.20 Bancassurance refers to the insurance distribution 
model where insurance products are sold through the 
bank branch network. The model has acquired popularity 
in the Indian context as many large banking groups in 
the country are also promoters of insurance companies. 
Further, the geographical reach of banks has made them 
ideal vehicles for the distribution of insurance products. 
Instances of mis-selling of insurance products through 
this delivery channel have been evidenced, though there 
are extant regulatory requirements mandating that bank 
staff handling the sale of insurance products be 
adequately trained. There is also some anecdotal 
evidence of insurance products being sold as a ‘package’ 
along with banking products such as deposits and loans, 
raising issues of conflict of interest. The proposed 
regulations on Investment Advisors by SEBI and on 
Bancassurance by the Insurance Regulatory and 
Development Authority (IRDA) are likely to address the 
issue. Concerted efforts to educate customers in this 
regard will also be necessary.
Financial Market Infrastructure (FMI)
The country’s FMI functioned smoothly despite 
heightened market volatility
4.21 The payment and settlement systems in the 
country remained robust and continued to function 
without any major disruption. The FMI displayed a 
significant degree of resilience, with central 
counterparties in different segments managing the 
impact of heightened volatility in various markets, 
including the foreign exchange markets (Box 4.2).
Liberalisation of access criteria provided a fi llip to 
electronic payment systems
4.22 The shift towards electronic modes of settlement 
continued, with the value of transactions settled through 
The year 2011-12, and especially the period under review, 
witnessed heightened volatility (Chapter 2). The increased 
volatility and the sharp depreciation in the value of the 
Indian rupee resulted in signifi cant changes in the marked 
to market (MTM) margin liability of the members of CCIL’s 
forex segment, with the impact depending on the net currency 
positions of the participants.
Managing the risks necessitated increase in initial margins 
and, in also in some instances of increase in variation 
margins. On a few occasions, heightened intraday volatility 
resulted in the margin cover being reduced by more than 50 
per cent warranting the collection of intraday MTM margins 
(Table 4.1 and Chart 4.5).
Table 4.1: Details of Imposition of Volatility Margin during 2011-12
Date Forex Forward 
Segment (%)
Forex Settlement 
segment (%)
22-Sep-11 to 26-Sep-11 37.5 0.25
28-Oct-11 to 31-Oct-11 5.0 -
09-Nov-11 to 11-Nov-11 2.5 -
01-Dec-11 to 02-Dec-11 5.0 -
16-Dec-11 to 19-Dec-11 27.5 0.25
27-Jan-12 to 30-Jan-12 2.5 -
Box 4.2: Increased volatility in the foreign exchange market and CCIL’s US$/INR settlement
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the Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system 
accounting for over 74 per cent of total settlement values 
as at end March 2012. Volume wise, the share of retail 
electronic transactions grew from 37 per cent in March 
2011 to about 45 per cent in March 2012.
4.23 The migration of payment transactions to RTGS 
and National Electronic Fund Transfer (NEFT) settlement 
modes is likely to gain impetus from the liberalisation 
of access criteria to electronic payment systems5. So far, 
the centralised electronic payment systems provided for 
only direct membership. The sub-membership route has 
been enabled for all licensed banks to participate in 
NEFT and RTGS systems. Such sub-membership would 
be an alternate mechanism to licensed banks which have 
the technological capabilities but are not participating 
in centralised payment systems on account of access 
criteria or cost considerations.
Risks minimised in RTGS… but effi cacy of intraday 
liquidity management varies  across participants
4.24 RTGS systems permit transactions to be settled 
deal by deal and in real time, thus attempting to 
eliminate systemic and settlement risks. Specifi cally, 
RTGS can substantially contribute to the reduction in 
the duration of credit and liquidity exposures in 
payment and settlement systems. In the Indian context, 
an empirical analysis of the settlement lags in the RTGS6 
reveals that 70 per cent of average daily transactions 
(constituting 65 per cent of the average daily settlement 
amount) are settled instantaneously (Chart 4.6). This is 
facilitated by proactive intraday liquidity management 
by banks7, provision of intraday liquidity by the central 
bank and the ‘double duty’ performed by prudential 
reserve balances maintained by banks. Nevertheless, 
nearly 25 per cent of transactions (by amount) are settled 
with a lag of more than one minute while 15 per cent 
are settled with a lag of more than 10 minutes. There 
are also large variations observed with respect to 
settlement lags amongst different participants of the 
RTGS system. The underlying trends, especially with 
regard to the outliers will need to be carefully monitored 
(Charts 4.7 and 4.8).
5 http://rbi.org.in/scripts/Notifi cationUser.aspx?Id=7113&Mode=0
6 The empirical analysis used individual transaction data from the RTGS for 15 working days in the month of March 2012.
7 Several large participants of RTGS have procured intraday liquidity management systems which enables them to manage payment queues internally.
Chart 4.6: Settlement lags in RTGS
Source: RBI
Chart 4.7 Daily average customer transactions settled 
within one minute
Source: RBI
Chart 4.8 Daily average interbank transactions settled 
within one minute
Source: RBI
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Designated settlement banks (DSBs) of CCIL act as 
quasi payment systems….
4.25 Quasi-payment systems are generally defi ned as 
“Commercial institutions responsible for clearing and 
settling payments on behalf of customers which 
represent, by value, a substantial percentage of payments 
…. being settled across the books of the institution 
rather than through an organised payment system”.8 
Risks posed by such institutions are similar to those 
posed by systemically important payment systems.
4.26 The risks arising from the concentration of 
associate members in the Collateralised Borrowing and 
Lending Obligation (CBLO) and securities segments of 
CCIL in two DSBs were highlighted in the FSR of 
December 2011. The risks are exacerbated by the fact 
that the DSBs themselves are large participants (with 
proprietary positions) in most market segments. An 
analysis of the settlement volumes indicates that 
associate members account for a signifi cant proportion 
of the settlement volumes (Chart 4.9). The DSBs, thus, 
act as quasi payment settlement systems and the risks 
they pose to the overall system will need to be monitored.
….necessitating CCIL to assume large intraday 
exposures to the DSBs
4.27 The large settlement values of the associate 
members result in CCIL assuming signifi cant intraday 
exposures to the DSBs (on account of the pay-in made 
by the associate members to the DSB) (Chart 4.10). CCIL 
has sanctioned limits for each of the DSBs, which are 
uncollateralised. There are also instances of exposure 
to the DSBs being in excess of the limits. Failure of one 
or more DSBs could pose systemic concerns and the 
trends in this regard need to be assessed vis-à-vis CCIL’s 
financial resources, its liquidity and credit risk 
management framework and extant regulatory 
prescriptions on the capital adequacy norms for banks’ 
exposures to central counterparties (CCPs)9. The Basel 
Committee is also working on the issues related to the 
appropriate capitalisation of banks’ exposure to CCPs. 
At present, exposures to CCPs under Basel II attract zero 
exposure value.
8 “Central bank oversight of payment and settlement systems”, BIS, May 2005
9 The exposures to CCPs on account of derivatives trading and securities fi nancing transactions ( e.g. CBLOs, Repos) outstanding against them, are currently 
assigned zero exposure value for counterparty credit risk, as it is presumed that the CCPs’ exposures to their counterparties are fully collateralised on a 
daily basis, thereby providing protection for the CCP’s credit risk exposures. Deposits / collateral kept by banks with CCIL, however, attract 20 per cent 
risk weight. (http://rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_CircularIndexDisplay.aspx?Id=5001).
Chart 4.9: Average settlement values of associate members as
per cent of total settlement values
Source: CCIL
Chart 4.10 CCIL’s exposures to Designated Settlement Banks
Source: CCIL
Financial Stability Report June 2012  
47
4.28 Available evidence suggests that the DSBs, in turn, 
extend intraday liquidity to the associate members 
including equity market players. If the associated risks 
are not rigorously managed by the DSBs, they could 
further exacerbate the risks faced by the CCP. Going 
forward, however, the Basel III liquidity risk framework, 
which incorporates effective management of intraday 
liquidity, may alleviate these risks.
OTC Derivative markets
Delays in implementing OTC derivative market 
reforms observed internationally
4.29 Several issues and challenges facing the OTC 
markets in India, viz., skewed participation structure, 
need for greater standardisation, introduction of central 
clearing, etc., were highlighted in previous FSRs. Even 
as these issues remain relevant, challenges are posed by 
the international reforms agenda for OTC derivatives 
viz., “all standardised OTC derivative contracts be traded 
on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where 
appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties 
by end-2012”. The FSB has observed delays in both rule 
making and implementation of the reform process across 
G20 jurisdictions. Certain exceptions for some derivative 
products, e.g. foreign exchange forwards, are, however, 
under consideration.
4.30 In the case of India, the market for OTC derivatives 
has developed in a calibrated manner along with, in 
most cases, a concomitant regulatory framework. CCP 
arrangements already exist in the country for foreign 
exchange forward contracts involving the domestic 
currency. Similar arrangements are being contemplated 
for other products. However, markets such as that for 
Credit Defaults Swaps are in a nascent stage and extant 
volumes do not warrant centralised settlements. The 
existing reporting arrangements for OTC derivatives 
encompass foreign exchange, interest rate, government 
securities, corporate bonds and money market 
instruments and are being strengthened, as was 
discussed in previous FSRs. Going forward, the key 
10 “Thoughts on determining central clearing eligibility of OTC derivatives”, Bank of England, Financial Stability Paper No. 14, CheSidanius and Anne 
Wetherilt, March 2012
11 Financial Stability Report, (December 2010, Paragraphs 3.48) includes an analysis of concentration risks posed by OTC derivatives market in India 
(http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=23666)
12 The sudden dip in volume observed in March 2012 is largely due to reduction in notional positions as a result of trade compression introduced by 
CCIL recently, as was discussed in previous FSRs.
priority for Indian markets would be greater 
standardisation of OTC products, introduction of central 
clearing arrangements for a greater number of such 
products and reporting of all OTC trades to the trade 
repository.
Volumes in the Interest Rate Swap (IRS) market in 
India could warrant centralised settlement….
4.31 Low volumes in some derivative markets make it 
challenging to introduce guaranteed clearing for such 
products. A recent Bank of England report10, which 
attempts to construct a defi nition for “central clearing 
eligibility” of a product, observed that liquidity is a key 
determinant in a central counterparty’s decision to clear 
a product and that the systemic risk reduction benefi ts 
of central clearing can be achieved only when contracts 
meet this eligibility criteria.
4.32 In the Indian context, IRS, launched in 1999, is 
the only OTC derivative product where the market 
volumes have grown substantially. The growth has been 
particularly marked in the case of the overnight index 
swap based on the overnight money market index (Chart 
4.11). The participation structure in the market, 
however, remains skewed with foreign banks dominating 
the IRS market11.
Chart 4.11 Outstanding notional IRS volumes at the 
end of the month12
Source: CCIL
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…but will necessitate robust risk management by the 
CCP and potentially onerous margin requirements
4.33 Central clearing of IRS trades will shift the primary 
responsibility of managing counterparty risks to the CCP. 
It is, thus, critical that the CCP has adequate fi nancial 
resources and exercises effective risk control. The CCP 
will need to, inter alia, design margin and other risk 
management requirements which account for the 
complexity of the underlying instruments and maintain 
suffi cient liquid resources to ensure settlement under 
a wide range of potential stress scenarios. Further, the 
overall cost to participants of central clearing of 
derivative transactions will need to be assessed as 
margin requirements could be very high for some banks 
during volatile times. As all positions will need to be 
collateralised, shifting IRS transactions to a CCP could 
entail large collateral requirements.
4.34 The concentration risks arising from the gamut 
of activities carried out by CCIL have been fl agged in 
previous FSRs. Additionally, entrusting the responsibility 
of centralised clearing of IRS trades or any other OTC 
derivative trades to CCIL could add to these risks and 
will have to be contingent on a thorough assessment of 
its ability and fi nancial resources, including liquidity 
resources, to handle extreme market situations.
Bilateral margins for OTC derivatives may have 
systemic implications
4.35 Migration of all OTC derivative contracts to central 
clearing will be challenging and may also not be desirable 
as OTC products can perform a valuable function of 
offering customised contracts to suit individual hedging 
requirements. These contracts, however, will continue 
to engender counterparty and systemic risks. Bilateral 
margins on non-centrally cleared products are, thus, 
being contemplated internationally to reduce the 
systemic risks arising from such products and for 
creating incentives for centralised clearing. Such margins 
may need to be considered in the Indian context also, 
after weighing the advantages against the systemic 
implications of the increased collateral requirements. 
The potential benefi ts of margin requirements could be 
partially offset by the impact arising from the need to 
13 Principles for fi nancial market infrastructures, April 2012 (http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss101.htm)
provide high-quality, liquid collateral, especially at a time 
when the Basel III liquidity requirements will create 
additional demand for similar securities. IMF’s recent 
Global Financial Stability Report (April 2012) has also 
highlighted that “heightened uncertainty, regulatory 
reforms and the extraordinary post-crisis responses of 
central banks in the advanced economies have been 
driving up demand for safe assets… even as the supply 
of such assets has contracted,… with negative 
implications for global fi nancial stability”.
New and demanding international standards issued 
for FMIs……
4.36 New international standards for payment, clearing 
and settlement systems were issued in April 2012 by 
the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems 
(CPSS) and the Technical Committee of the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)13. The 
new standards (called “principles”) will be applicable to 
all systemically important payment systems, central 
securities depositories, securities settlement systems, 
central counterparties and trade repositories (collectively 
“fi nancial market infrastructures” or “FMIs”). The set of 
24 principles is designed to ensure that the essential 
infrastructure supporting global fi nancial markets is 
robust and better placed to withstand fi nancial shocks. 
They encompass issues related to the legal basis and the 
governance framework of the FMI, its credit, liquidity 
and operational risk management framework, settlement 
systems, default management, access criteria and the 
effi ciency and transparency of FMI’s.
…necessitating assessment of compliance of domestic 
FMIs with the Principles
4.37 Compared with the current standards, the new 
principles pose more stringent requirements in 
important areas like financial resources and risk 
management procedures of an FMI, default handing and 
the mitigation of business and operational risk. In the 
Indian context, previous formal assessments observed 
the country’s FMIs to be broadly compliant with the 
then prevalent international standards e.g. the Core 
Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems, 
Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems 
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and Risk Management Principles for Central 
Counterparties. Going forward, the degree to which 
domestic FMIs observe the new principles will need to 
be evaluated.
Legal amendments will be necessary to ensure orderly 
handling of a FMI default
4.38 Given the criticality of the functioning of FMIs, 
the risks which FMIs can pose to fi nancial stability in 
the event of a default, warrants that an effective 
resolution mechanism be put in place to ensure orderly 
winding up of such entities. The FSB’s Key Attributes of 
Effective Resolution Regimes for fi nancial institutions14 
are also applicable for FMIs.
4.39 In the Indian context, currently, there is no 
provision in the RBI Act, 1934, or the Payment and 
Settlement System (PSS) Act, 2007, which enable the 
recapitalisation, orderly winding up or reorganisation 
of FMIs regulated by the Reserve Bank. In the absence 
of a specifi c legal mandate, the insolvency proceedings 
as laid down under the general law would be applicable. 
Compliance with the Key Attributes would necessitate 
that the Reserve Bank is conferred with adequate powers 
for effective resolution of the FMIs regulated by it, such 
as CCPs and payment systems through appropriate 
amendments to the PSS Act.
14 http://www.fi nancialstabilityboard.org/publications/ r_111104cc.pdf
15 See Financial Stability Report, Issue No. 1, March 2010 for a complete description of the coverage of deposit insurance in India (http://www.rbi.org.
in/scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=22230)
Chart 4.12: Share of insured deposits of different 
categories of banks
Source: DICGC
Chart 4.13: Cross-Country Comparison of Coverage Levels at end-2010 (absolute level and % of per capita GDP)
Source: FSB Thematic Review of Deposit Insurance Systems: Peer Review Report
Safety net arrangements
The Coverage and Reserve Ratio of the deposit 
insurance fund remains low…
4.40 In India, deposit insurance is mandatory for all 
banks. Deposit insurance is provided by the Deposit 
Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation (DICGC), a 
wholly owned subsidiary of the Reserve Bank of India 
(Chart 4.12).15 The coverage levels of the deposit 
insurance in India, both in terms of absolute amount 
and as a percentage of per capita GDP, remain low as 
compared to international standards (Chart 4.13). The 
Reserve Ratio (ratio of fund balance to insured deposits), 
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which stood at 1.4 per cent as at end March 2012, is also 
low as compared to peer emerging market economies, 
though a target reserve ratio has not been prescribed for 
India (Chart 4.14).
…. Necessitating exploring options to strengthen 
DICGC’s fund base
4.41 Bank failures in the Indian context have typically 
taken place in the case of banks in the co-operative 
sector. DICGC’s fund, as per current coverage levels, may 
not be adequate in the event of a large bank failing. 
Several options, for instance, income and service tax 
exemption for the Corporation, hiking the premium 
charged, provision for emergency liquidity support, etc. 
may need to be explored with a view to strengthening 
the fund.
FSB Peer review of deposit insurance systems throw 
up several lessons for DICGC
4.42 The FSB recently undertook a peer review of 
deposit insurance systems16 among its member 
institutions based on the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision – International Association of Deposit 
Insurers (BCBS-IADI) Core Principle for Effective Deposit 
Insurance Systems. Several recommendations of the 
peer review report are particularly relevant for India and 
will need to be carefully examined. These include:
i. review of coverage levels to ensure that it strikes 
an appropriate balance between depositor 
protection and market discipline;
ii. prompt depositor reimbursement in situations 
when payout is the only choice to deal with a 
16 http://www.fi nancialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_120208.pdf
bank failure; this needs to be supported by 
comprehensive and prompt access to bank data, 
early information access via a single customer 
view, and robust information technology 
infrastructure;
iii. strengthening the degree of coordination between 
the deposit insurance agency and other safety net 
players to ensure effective resolution planning 
and prompt depositor payment; and
iv. unambiguous and immediate access to reliable 
funding sources (including any back-up funding 
options) to meet the fi nancing requirements.
Source: FSB Thematic Review of Deposit Insurance Systems: Peer Review Report
Chart 4.14: Cross-Country Comparison of Reserve Ratios at end-2010
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Chapter V
Systemic Risk Assessment
The Systemic Risk Survey, the second in the series conducted by the Reserve Bank, revealed that fi nancial sector 
stakeholders continued to repose confi dence in the stability of the domestic fi nancial system. The level of confi dence, 
however, seems to have diminished since the previous Survey. Market volatility emerges as the chief concern of 
respondents along with the risks associated with high levels of fi scal and current account defi cits. Policy risk 
(including perceived slowdown in policy making) also emerges more prominently in the current Survey. The 
Systemic Liquidity Indicator pointed to some stress in liquidity conditions during March and April as the 
banking system’s liquidity defi cit remained consistently in excess of the Reserve Bank’s stated comfort zone. 
Some concerns emerged from the rising trend of short term borrowings of banks especially as the systemic 
importance of some banks has increased over the last one year. Insurance companies and Mutual Funds (MFs) 
remain vulnerable to contagion risks from the banking system while banks continue to rely on these segments 
for their funding needs. The results of a series of stress tests carried out to study the impact of various adverse 
macro-fi nancial shocks on the health of banks showed that the banking system remained resilient even under 
extreme stress scenarios. An assessment of the stability of the banking system conducted through a series of 
Banking Stability Measures (BSMs) indicated that distress dependencies amongst banks had increased in 
recent periods but remained well below the levels observed during the global fi nancial crisis in 2008-09.
Systemic Risk Survey
5.1 The fi rst Systemic Risk Survey was conducted by 
the Reserve Bank in October 2011 to capture the views 
of market participants and other stakeholders on the 
aggregate risks facing the fi nancial system. The second 
Survey was conducted in April 2012.
Volatility in the fi nancial markets voted the primary 
concern
5.2 The second Survey reveals that stakeholders 
perceive volatility in the markets as the single most 
important risk facing the fi nancial system, followed 
by global and fi scal risks. Asset quality, which was 
perceived to be the most signifi cant risk in the previous 
Survey, emerged as the second most signifi cant risk in 
this Survey. Respondents felt that risks from the twin 
defi cits and from perceived slowdown in policy making 
have increased sharply since the last Survey (Chart 5.1 
and Chart 5.2)1.
Risks emanating from infl ation most diffi cult for the 
country to manage
5.3 Survey respondents felt that managing infl ation 
continues to be the biggest challenge for the country 
Chart 5.1: Specifi c risks identifi ed in the Risk Survey, October 2011
Chart 5.2: Specifi c risks identifi ed in the Risk Survey, April 2012
1 The bars in Charts 5.1 and 5.2 represent the weighted aggregate of number of respondents who have identifi ed the corresponding risk, the weights 
representing the probability assigned by the respondent to the occurrence of the risk. 
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(Chart 5.3). For Survey respondents from financial 
institutions, asset quality and funding risks remained 
the most diffi cult to manage (Chart 5.4).
Perceived risks to domestic fi nancial stability increased
5.4 About 43 per cent of the respondents felt that 
the probability of a systemic event impacting the global 
fi nancial system in the short term is ‘high’, while 46 
per cent thought that the probability was ‘high’ in the 
Chart 5.3: Risks most diffi cult for the country to manage Chart 5.4: Risks most diffi cult for fi nancial institutions to manage
Survey Responses on the probability of a ‘high’ impact event in the global fi nancial system (per cent)
Chart 5.5: In the short term Chart 5.6: In the medium term
medium term. This represents a departure from the 
earlier Survey where over 60 per cent of the participants 
felt that the probability of a systemic event impacting 
the global fi nancial system in the short run was ‘high’. 
Respondents felt that the risks to the stability of the 
domestic fi nancial system in the medium term had 
increased (Charts 5.5 to Chart 5.8).
5.5 The Survey result also revealed that an increasing 
number of respondents felt that the impact of a global 
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systemic event on the domestic fi nancial system will be 
‘high’ (Table 5.1).
5.6 The Survey respondents continued to repose 
confi dence in the stability of the domestic fi nancial 
system with 25 per cent of the respondents being ‘very 
confi dent’ in the stability of the domestic fi nancial 
system while another 67 per cent of the respondents 
were ‘fairly confi dent’. The level of confi dence had, 
however, diminished relative to October 2011, when 
the fi rst Survey was conducted. More than half of the 
respondents were ‘not very confi dent’ in the stability 
of the global fi nancial system (Table 5.2).
Systemic Liquidity Indicator
Liquidity defi cit remained outside Reserve Bank’s 
stated comfort zone
5.7 During the period under review, the banking 
system’s liquidity deficit remained consistently in 
excess of the Reserve Bank’s stated comfort zone, driven 
mainly by transient factors like build-up of Government 
cash balances, rise in currency in circulation, advance 
tax outfl ows and other factors such as forex market 
operations by the Reserve Bank.
5.8 The Reserve Bank began injecting liquidity into 
the system through Open Market Operations (OMOs) 
from November 24, 2011 and injected around ` 1,247 
billion of primary liquidity during 2011-12. The average 
Table 5.1: Impact of a Global Systemic Event on the 
Domestic Financial System (Per cent)
Very High High Moderate Low No Impact
October 2011 8 35 47 10 0
April 2012 12 43 35 10 0
Table 5.2: Confi dence in the Global and Domestic Financial Systems 
(Per cent)
Global Financial 
System
Domestic Financial 
System
Oct-2011 Apr-2012 Oct-2011 Apr-2012
Complete confi dence 0 0 0 1
Very confi dent 1 4 39 24
Fairly confi dent 45 40 58 67
Not very confi dent 52 54 3 8
No confi dence 2 2 0 0
Survey Responses on the probability of a ‘high’ impact event in the domestic fi nancial system (per cent)
Chart 5.7: In the short term Chart 5.8: In the medium term
 Chapter V Systemic Risk Assessment
54
daily net liquidity injection through the Liquidity 
Adjustment Facility (LAF) during the Q3 of 2011-12 was 
` 874 billion.
5.9 During Q4 of 2011-12, the liquidity position 
tightened further because of forex market operations 
and sizeable build up of Government cash balances 
(especially in mid March 2012). The Reserve Bank 
reduced the Cash Reserve Ratio by 50 bps from January 
28, 2012, and further by another 75 bps from March 
10, 2012, thereby injecting primary liquidity to the 
extent of about ` 800 billion. The Reserve Bank also 
re-introduced additional Repo under LAF (Second LAF 
Repo) on reporting Fridays from February 10, 2012 to 
provide further comfort to market participants. The 
average daily net liquidity injection through the LAF 
during the Q4 was `1424 billion.
Exceptionally high injection of primary liquidity was 
warranted
5.10 The net liquidity injection through LAF reached 
an all-time high on March 30, 2012 (`2027.85 billion) 
as banks tried to shore-up their balance sheets and 
front-load cash reserves. During March 2012, there 
was injection of liquidity under the Marginal Standing 
Facility (MSF) on nine occasions. With a view to 
providing fl exibility to scheduled commercial banks 
(SCBs), the Reserve Bank conducted additional LAF-Repo 
on March 30, 2012, and LAF and MSF on March 31, 2012. 
On March 30, 2012, the four-day call money rate closed 
at a three-year high of 15 per cent on funds constraint 
in the debt market. In order to provide greater liquidity 
cushion, the Reserve Bank also raised the borrowing 
limit of SCBs under the MSF from one per cent to two per 
cent of their Net Demand and Time Liabilities (NDTL). 
The defi cit liquidity condition persisted in May 2012, 
partly due to the rise in currency in circulation.
2 The SLI uses the following four indicators representing various segments of the market: Weighted Average Call Rate - RBI Repo Rate; 3 month Commercial 
Paper (CP) Rate - 3 month Certifi cate of Deposits (CD) Rate; 3 month CD Rate - 3 month Forex Market Implied Deposit Rate; and Weighted Average Call 
Rate - 3 Month Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS) Rate. The index is based on ‘standard normal’ or ‘variance-equal weighted’ method and a value above 
zero would indicate above ‘normal’ levels of liquidity related stress in the system.
3 The network analysis has been conducted based on data in respect of bilateral fund based and non-fund based exposures between banks, asset 
management companies, insurance companies, NBFCs, fi nancial institutions and urban cooperative banks. The transactions where the settlement takes 
place through a central counterparty have not been reckoned. The Network model used in the analysis has been developed by Professor Sheri Markose 
(University of Essex) and Dr. Simone Giansante (Bath University) in collaboration with the Financial Stability Unit, Reserve Bank of India.
5.11 The Systemic Liquidity Index (SLI) introduced 
in the FSR for December 20112, is based on a multiple 
indicator approach and aims to capture the overall 
funding scenario in the financial system viz., the 
banking, non-banking fi nancial and the corporate sectors 
and includes liquidity in foreign exchange market. While 
it rose in March 2012, it remained well below the levels 
of stress witnessed in 2008 in the post-Lehman crisis 
period. In April 2012, the indicator eased slightly (Chart 
5.9).
Chart 5.9: The Systemic Liquidity Index
Source: RBI staff calculations
Network Analysis of the Financial System3
5.12 Network analysis of the fi nancial system enables 
gauging the interconnectedness in the banking / fi nancial 
system and assessing the risks arising out of possible 
contagion. It forms a critical part of the toolkit for 
macroprudential surveillance.
5.13 The size of the interbank market decreased 
marginally (2.8 per cent) between March 2011 and March 
2012. The sharpest decline was evidenced in the case of 
the old private sector banks, which constitute 3 per cent 
of the entire market (Chart 5.10 and Chart 5.11).
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Trends in the short term borrowing of banks could 
engender liquidity risks…
5.14 An analysis of trends in the short term inter bank 
borrowing of banks indicated that such borrowings, 
which consists mostly of certifi cate of deposits (CDs), 
form a sizeable portion of the funds raised in the 
interbank market. The ratio of the banking sector’s short 
term interbank borrowings to total borrowings stands at 
around 27 per cent. Further, short term borrowings have 
grown by nearly 40 per cent over a period of one year, 
even as the overall quantum of inter bank borrowing 
has fallen. As short term borrowings typically engender 
rollover risks, trends in this regard will need to be 
monitored (Chart 5.12).
5.15  Short term inter bank borrowings as a proportion 
of total outside liabilities of banks (at about 3 per cent) 
was not, however, very signifi cant. Nevertheless, there 
are some outlier banks which are heavily reliant on such 
borrowings and trends in this respect warrant greater 
attention (Chart 5.13).
The banking system continues to remain interconnected
5.16 The country’s banking system displays a 
signifi cant degree of interconnectedness. Together with 
this, a distinctly tiered structure of connectivity, where 
some banks are more connected than others, is also 
observed. An analysis of interconnectedness using the 
network model reveals that the level of connectivity 
in the system has increased slightly over the last year. 
(Box 5.1) Source: RBI staff calculations
Chart 5.13: Short Term Funds as a Ratio of Total Outside Liabilities 
(March 31, 2012)
Source: RBI staff calculations
Chart 5.12: Short Term Funds as a Ratio of Total Borrowing of SCBs 
(March 31, 2012)
Source: RBI staff calculations
Chart 5.10: Trends in the interbank market
Source: RBI staff calculations
Chart 5.11: Percentage change of activities over a one year 
period in the interbank market
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The network model uses various statistical measures to gauge 
the level of interconnectedness in the system. Some of the 
most important are as follows:
•	 Connectivity: This is a statistic that measures the extent 
of links between the nodes relative to all possible links in 
a complete graph.
•	 Cluster Coefficient: Clustering in networks measures how 
interconnected each node is. Specifically, there should be 
an increased probability that two of a node’s neighbours 
(banks’ counterparties in case of the financial network) 
are also neighbours themsleves. A high clustering 
coefficient for the network corresponds with high local 
interconnectedness prevailing in the system.
•	 Shortest Path Length: This gives the average number of 
directed links between a node and each of the other nodes 
in the network. Those nodes with the shortest path can be 
identified as hubs in the system.
•	 In-betweeness centrality: This statistic reports how the 
shortest path lengths pass through a particular node.
•	 Eigenvector measure of centrality: Eigenvector centrality 
is a measure of the importance of a node (bank) in a 
network. It describes how connected a node’s neighbours 
are and attempts to capture more than just the number 
of out degrees or direct ‘neighbours’ a node has. The 
algorithm assigns relative centrality scores to all nodes in 
the network and a bank’s centrality score is proportional 
to the sum of the centrality scores of all nodes to which it 
is connected. In general, for an NxN matrix there will be 
N different eigenvalues, for which an eigenvector solution 
exists. Each bank has a unique eigenvalue, which indicates 
its importance in the system. This measure is used in the 
network analysis to establish the systemic importance of 
a bank and by far it is the most crucial indicator.
The trends in the aforesaid network statistics for the Indian 
banking sector indicate that the level of interconnectedness 
has remained broadly stable over the last five quarters though 
some statistics point to a marginal increase in connectivity.
Mar 
2011
Jun 
2011
Sep 
2011
Dec 
2011
Mar 
2012
Connectivity 28.1 % 27.8 % 28.7 % 26.4 % 29.1 %
Cluster Coefficient 41.4 % 41.1 % 42.7 % 42.0 % 41.4 %
Average Shortest Path Length 1.73 % 1.77 % 1.73 % 1.86 % 1.74 %
Average In-betweeness 
centrality
53.38 % 59.96 % 59.06 % 68.66 % 53.44 %
Eigenvalue 65 % 61 % 57 % 64 % 59 %
Eigenvector centrality of 
dominant node
0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16
Source: RBI staff calculations.
Box 5.1: Network Statistics of the Banking System
Source: RBI staff calculations
Chart 5.14: Network of the Banking System – March 31, 2011
Source: RBI staff calculations
Chart 5.15: Network of the Banking System – March 31, 2012
The systemic importance of some banks may have 
risen…
5.17 The majority of the banks appearing in the inner 
core of the network of the Indian banking system 
remained the same over the last one year.4 However, the 
number of net borrowers in the inner core has increased 
during this period, pointing to increased systemic 
importance of these banks. (Charts 5.14 and Chart 5.15)
4  A tiered structure is one where different institutions have different degrees or levels of connectivity with others in the network. In the present analysis, 
the most connected banks (based on their eigenvector centrality) are in the inner most core (at the centre of the network diagrams in Charts 5.14 and 
5.15). Banks are then placed in the mid core, outer core and the periphery (the respective concentric circles around the centre in the diagrams), based 
on their level of relative connectivity. The range of connectivity of the banks is defined as a ratio of each bank’s in degree and out degree divided by 
that of the most connected bank. Banks that are ranked in the top 10 percentile of this ratio constitute the inner core. This is followed by a mid core of 
banks ranked between 90 and 70 percentile and a 3rd tier of banks ranked between 40 and 70 percentile. Banks with connectivity ratio of less than 40 
per cent are categorised as the periphery. The colour coding of the links in the tiered network diagram represents the borrowing from different tiers in 
the network (for example, the green links represent borrowings from the banks in the inner core).
5  For a complete description of the methodology on the contagion analysis, please refer to FSR for December 2011 (rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/PublicationReport/
Pdfs/5SYRA221211.pdf)
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... as is also indicated by the results of contagion 
analysis
5.18 A contagion analysis using the network model 
reveals that the maximum possible loss to the banking 
system due to the failure of the ‘most connected’ bank 
has risen from 12 per cent of the capital of the banking 
system to over 16 per cent over the four quarters of 2011 
(Chart 5.16). The average loss caused by the failure of 
the three ‘most connected’ banks has also increased 
(Chart 5.17). The contagion risks, however, appear to be 
confi ned to a few banks (Chart 5.18). Financial stability 
considerations, therefore, warrant that the risks posed 
by the increased interconnectedness of the few banks in 
the inner core need to be carefully monitored, through, 
inter alia, rigorous microprudential supervision of these 
entities.
The major lenders in the fi nancial system remain 
vulnerable to contagion risks
5.19 The network analysis of the broader fi nancial 
system, presented in the previous FSR, had thrown up 
the interconnectedness among the banking, insurance 
and the mutual funds segments of the fi nancial system. 
The analysis revealed that the largest net lenders in the 
system were the insurance companies and the Asset 
Management Companies (AMCs), while the banks 
were the largest borrowers. This renders the lenders 
vulnerable to the risk of contagion from the banking 
system. The random failure of a bank which has large 
borrowings from the insurance and mutual funds 
segments of the fi nancial system may have signifi cant 
implications for the entire system (Charts 5.19 and 5.20).
Source: RBI staff calculations
Chart 5.16: Contagion due to the failure of a top net borrower5
Source: RBI staff calculations
Chart 5.17: Potential loss to the banking system due to  failure of top banks
Source: RBI staff calculations
Chart 5.18: Potential loss distribution in the banking system 
due to failure of banks
Source: RBI staff calculations
Chart 5.19: Insurance companies’ investments in different bank groups
5  For a complete description of the methodology on the contagion analysis, please refer to FSR for December 2011 (rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/PublicationReport/
Pdfs/5SYRA221211.pdf)
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Banks reliant on the insurance sector and mutual 
funds, specially for short term funds…
5.20 SCBs were considerably dependent on borrowings 
from insurance companies and mutual funds. As 
at end-March 2012, nearly 27 per cent of the entire 
intra-fi nancial system borrowings by banks was from 
insurance companies while another 37 per cent was 
from mutual funds. The reliance is particularly high in 
case of private sector banks (Table 5.3). Such borrowings 
from mutual funds and insurance companies constitute 
6.8 per cent of the banking systems’ outside liabilities.
5.21 The bulk of the borrowing by SCBs from the 
mutual funds (81 per cent) consists of short term funds, 
which could engender rollover and liquidity risks. These 
borrowings almost entirely comprise CD issuances. 
In contrast, borrowings from insurance companies 
primarily have a longer maturity, with over 88 per cent 
of the borrowings carrying a remaining maturity of at 
least one year (Table 5.4).
Banking Stability Measures and Estimation of Expected 
Shortfall
5.22 The stability of banking system was studied 
through various Banking Stability Measures, which 
gauge the impact of distress in one bank on the rest 
through direct and indirect links. For assessing these 
dependencies, the financial system is modeled as 
a portfolio of a specific group of banks (Segoviano 
and Goodhart, 2009). The model uses the Banking 
System’s Portfolio Multivariate Density (BSMD)6, which 
characterises both the individual and joint asset value 
movements of the portfolio of banks. The BSMD is 
recovered from the Probabilities of Distress (PoDs) of 
banks under analysis, which is observed empirically 
based on 99 per cent Value at Risk (VaR)7 of daily return 
on banks’ equity prices.
Table 5.3 Contribution of Insurance companies and 
MFs to Banks Borrowings
Borrowings/Funds 
received from the 
Insurance Sector
Borrowings/Funds 
received from MFs
` 
billion
As percentage 
of total 
borrowing
` 
billion
As percentage 
of total 
borrowing
Banking Sector 1828 26.5 2591 37.1
Public Sector Banks 1153 27.2 1761 41.5
Old Private Sector Banks 60 25.2 185 77.7
New Private Sector Banks 583 40.7 631 44.2
Foreign Banks 32 2.9 14 1.3
Source: RBI staff calculations
Source: RBI staff calculations
Chart 5.20: MFs’ investments in different bank groups
6 A complete description of the methodology was presented in the third issue of the Financial Stability Report, June 2011 (http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/
BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=24557)
7 The methodology for calculation of PoDs has been revised in this FSR as compared to the method used in FSR December 2011. The calculated PoDs 
are used as an input for derivation of JPoDs and the Banking Stability Measures as well as the Expected Shortfall. Earlier, threshold for calculation of 
PoDs were derived based on daily equity price returns since January 2007. Since during the fi nancial crisis of 2008-09, the Indian banking equity prices 
recorded higher decline in return as compared to the current time as well as before the crisis, the threshold return limit (VaR) was set at a much lower 
level. Hence, the empirically observed PoDs were unable to capture the relative variation of equity return during the current period. Therefore, to 
overcome this limitation, the revised calculations of PoDs are based on the threshold derived after excluding the period of the fi nancial crisis (i.e. on 
the daily equity price return since January 2010). All the measures show a slight upward movement (as compared to results published earlier). Further, 
to capture stress event in a broader way, the revised PoDs are based on 99 per cent VaR instead of 99.5 per cent VaR.
Table 5.4: Percentage distribution of Insurance companies and MFs 
in investment /lending in the banking system
(Per cent)
Insurance Companies Mutual Funds
Short 
term
Long 
term
Total Short 
term
Long 
term
Total
Banking sector 11.6 88.4 100 81.0 19.0 100
Public Sector Banks 8.2 54.9 63.1 58.2 9.8 67.9
Old Private Sector Banks 1.2 2.0 3.3 5.8 1.3 7.1
New Private Sector Banks 1.5 30.4 31.9 16.8 7.6 24.4
Foreign Banks 0.6 1.1 1.8 0.2 0.3 0.6
Source: RBI staff calculations
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Common distress in the system: JPoD and BSI
5.23 The probability of distress of the entire banking 
system, as measured by Joint Probability of Distress 
(JPoD), has been showing an upward trend over the 
last two years, though the probability continued to 
be low when compared to the level seen during the 
2008-09.The Banking Stability Index (BSI), which 
measures the expected number of banks which could 
become distressed given that at least one bank becomes 
distressed, declined from the highs registered during 
2008-09 till end-2010. Thereafter, it has been showing 
an increasing trend (Chart 5.21).
5.24 Trends in both JPoD and BSI indicate that inter-
dependencies among banks have risen in recent times 
though they remain much below the level seen during 
the global fi nancial crisis.
Distress between specific banks: Toxicity & 
Vulnerability Index
5.25 The distress between specifi c banks has been 
measured based on Toxicity Index and Vulnerability 
Index8. As in the case of common distress indices, both 
the Toxicity and Vulnerability indices have shown a 
declining trend since the global fi nancial crisis but the 
indices have been rising in recent periods, especially 
since 2011. (Charts 5.22 and 5.23).
Cascade effects due to distress in a specifi c bank
5.26 Cascade effects are a measure of the probability 
of one or more banks becoming distressed, given that a 
specifi c bank becomes distressed. The measure refl ects 
the systemic importance of a bank. Though these 
conditional probabilities do not imply causation; these 
can provide important insights into systemic inter-
linkages among the banks. The cascade probabilities 
show that the Indian banking system is highly 
interlinked and had a very high distress dependency 
during the fi nancial crisis. This effect decreased in 2010, 
8 The Toxicity Index (TI) is the average probability that a bank under distress may cause distress to another bank in the system while the Vulnerability 
Index (VI) quantifi es the vulnerability of a bank given distress in the other banks in the system.
Source: Bloomberg data and RBI staff calculations
Chart 5.21: Movement of JPoD and BSI
Source: Bloomberg data and RBI staff calculations
Chart 5.22: Movement of Toxicity Index of Banks
Source: Bloomberg data and RBI staff calculations
Chart 5.23: Movement of Vulnerability Index of Banks
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but has shown an increasing trend in recent periods 
(Chart 5.24).
Domino Impact on the System: Cascade Effect
5.27 The systemic importance and ‘domino’ effect 
of a specifi c bank can be quantifi ed as the likelihood 
of distress in the system dependent on distress in the 
bank (Chart 5.25). The domino impact for failure of the 
entire banking system has increased marginally in recent 
times.
Expected Shortfall
5.28 The banking system’s Expected Shortfall (ES)9, 
which had a declining trend during 2008 to 2010, has 
been increasing since 2011. The ES was estimated to 
be around 8.5 per cent of total assets of the banking 
system in December 2008. Since then, the ES had 
declined significantly. However, beginning 2011, it 
has been showing an increasing trend, though the ES 
remains much below the levels observed during the 
global fi nancial crisis. During March 2012, the ES stood 
at 3.4 per cent of total assets. Projected values of the ES 
for the coming quarters indicate that the shortfall may 
increase marginally (Chart 5.26).
Macro stress testing10
5.29 A series of macro stress tests was carried out 
to study the impact of various adverse macro shocks 
on banks’ credit quality. Four different econometric 
tools were used for the purpose. Apart from tests 
conducted at the system level, the exercise was also 
performed at bank-group and sectoral levels. In previous 
FSRs, the stress tests were conducted using various 
classical multivariate regressions. To ensure that the 
stress testing exercise takes cognisance of the tail 
events, quantile regression has also been adopted (Box 
5.2). An assessment of systemic risk under different 
macroeconomic shocks from complementary angles was, 
thus, possible.
9  Expected shortfall is a popular measure of systemic risk. It provides an informative summary of the severity of extreme events that occur with a 
small probability but can have system-wide consequences. Expected shortfall is measured as the estimated weighted average loss of assets in the tail 
risk region with the respective probability of losses being considered as the weights. Under a continuous loss distribution (Z), expected shortfall at the 
100(1-)% confi dence level ( ES (Z) ) is defi ned as, ES (Z) = E[Z  ZVaR (Z)]. Hence, Expected shortfall is the conditional expectation of loss given 
that the loss is beyond the VaR level.
10 The methodology is in the Annex.
Source: Bloomberg data and RBI staff calculations
Chart 5.24: Systemic Inter-linkages among the Banks: Cascade Effect
Source: Bloomberg data and RBI staff calculations
Chart 5.25: Domino Impact of Banks on the Entire System: Cascade Effect
Note: Jun 2012 and Sep 2012 are projected values
Source: Supervisory & Bloomberg data and RBI staff calculations
Chart 5.26: Expected Shortfall to Total Assets: System Level
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The macro stress test is a tool to assess the vulnerability 
of the banking system to extreme but plausible adverse 
macroeconomic shocks. The stochastic relationship between 
banking stability, typically taken as a credit risk indicator 
defi ned by non-performing advances ratio or slippage ratio, and 
macro variables is established through statistical/econometric 
models.
The results presented in previous FSRs were based on stress 
tests conducted using the techniques of multivariate logit 
regression, multivariate regression and multivariate panel 
regression. However, these classical regression analyses have 
their own limitations. First, they estimate the conditional mean 
of the dependent variable for the given set of independent 
variables (regressors) and, hence, this regression curve gives 
an incomplete picture. Second, these techniques assume that 
the impact of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable is symmetric and identical for different levels of 
the dependent variable, an assumption which may not hold 
under all circumstances. In particular, during a tail event, the 
relationship among the variables may change. To ensure that 
the stress testing exercise takes cognisance of the tail events, 
it is important that the exercise looks beyond the conditional 
mean and focuses on the tail. To this end, the technique of 
quantile regression tools, which enables explicit modeling of 
the tail of conditional distribution of the target variable, has 
been adopted.
Quantile regression is one of the tools, which provides facility 
of modeling not only mean/median, but also explicitly models 
the tail of the conditional distribution by using other quantiles 
of the target variable.
The -th quantile (in the interval (0,1)) of any random variable 
Y can be defi ned as
Traditionally, quantiles are calculated by arranging the values of 
the variable in ascending order and then take the observation 
at which threshold is reached. Koenkar and Bassett(1978) 
introduced a completely new method to calculate quantile 
which is based on an objective function which is given as below, 
where, the concept of ‘sorting’ was replaced by the concept of 
‘optimising’:
The above mentioned optimising technique can be extended 
for regression settings, which is as below:
Here, the -th conditional quantile of the error conditional 
on xt is zero (i.e. ) = 0). Hence, the -th conditional 
quantile of yt with respect to xt can be written as,
Assembling above mentioned equation and objective function, 
the parameter vector  can be computed by
The above parameter can be computed by representing it in a 
linear equation. If we rewrite yt as a function of only positive 
elements then,
with , k=1,2,…K and , t=1,2,…T, 
then the solution will be reduced to the following problem:
Subject to: , 
  
Whereas, the variance covariance matrix can be estimated by 
the three methods, namely, direct method, rank score method 
and resampling method.
The quantile regression also captures the changing relative 
importance of macro variables along the conditional credit risk 
distribution at various quantiles.
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Table 5.7: Projected CRAR using Different Models
 (Per cent)
Scenario Jun-12 Mar-13 Jun-12 Mar-13
Multivariate Logit Multivariate
Baseline 13.50 12.58 13.50 12.59
Medium Risk 13.50 12.53 13.50 12.55
Severe Risk 13.50 12.46 13.50 12.50
VAR Quantile
Baseline 13.50 12.60 13.48 12.58
Medium Risk 13.50 12.56 13.47 12.52
Severe Risk 13.50 12.52 13.47 12.46
Source: Supervisory data and RBI staff calculations
5.30 The macro stress tests encompass a series of 
risk scenarios incorporating a baseline and two adverse 
macroeconomic scenarios representing medium and 
severe risk, where the shocks in the macroeconomic 
parameters are assumed to occur simultaneously (Table 
5.5). The impact of the stress scenarios was assessed 
on the unconsolidated balance sheet of the domestic 
operations of SCBs. Essentially, the macro stress tests 
focus on different credit risk scenarios.
Credit quality may deteriorate under severe macro 
stress, but impact on CRAR is contained
5.31 The non performing asset (NPA) levels projected 
through different models suggest that, under the 
baseline scenario, NPAs are expected to be in the range 
of 3.3 to 3.5 per cent by March 2013. Under the stress 
scenarios, they could increase to 3.7 to 4.1 per cent (the 
medium risk scenario) and 4.1 to 4.6 per cent (the severe 
risk scenario). Under the severe risk scenario, the system 
level CRAR12 of commercial banks could decline to 12.5 
per cent by March 2013, which still remains well above 
the regulatory requirements (Tables 5.6 and 5.7).
 Table 5.5: Macroeconomic Scenario Assumptions11
(Per cent)
Scenario
Jun-12 Mar-13 Jun-12 Mar-13
GDP growth WPI Infl ation
Baseline 7.7 7.6 7.0 6.5
Medium Risk 6.7 5.6 8.4 9.3
Severe Risk 5.2 3.5 10.6 12.2
Short-term interest Rates Export/ GDP ratio
Baseline 8.2 7.9 16.3 16.4
Medium Risk 9.1 9.8 15.2 14.2
Severe Risk 10.5 11.6 13.5 12.0
Gross Fiscal Defi cit 
Baseline 5.1 5.1
Medium Risk 5.8 6.5
Severe Risk 6.9 7.9
11  The adverse scenarios were derived based on up to 1 standard deviation of 10 years historical data for medium risk and 1.25 to 2 standard deviation of 
10 years historical data for severe risk. These stress scenarios are stringent and conservative assessments under hypothetical-severely adverse economic 
conditions and should not be interpreted as forecasts or expected outcomes. The projections are based on data pertaining to the fourth quarter of
2011-12. The macroeconomic shocks have been assumed to occur in the fi rst quarter of 2012-13.
12 CRAR is based on BASEL II requirements.
Table 5.6: Projected Gross NPA ratio using Different Models
 (Per cent of total advances)
Scenario Jun-12 Mar-13 Jun-12 Mar-13
Multivariate Logit Multivariate
Baseline 3.1 3.5 3.0 3.4
Medium Risk 3.1 3.9 3.0 3.8
Severe Risk 3.1 4.5 3.0 4.3
VAR Quantile
Baseline 3.0 3.3 3.2 3.5
Medium Risk 3.0 3.7 3.3 4.1
Severe Risk 3.0 4.1 3.3 4.6
Source: Supervisory data and RBI staff calculations
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Impact of the risk scenarios varies across bank groups, 
but all groups are resilient
5.32 The impact of the risk scenarios varied across 
bank groups. The CRAR of public sector banks, under 
the severe stress scenario could fall to 11.5 per cent 
while the CRAR of the other bank groups is expected 
to be higher given the higher level of CRAR under the 
baseline scenario (Tables 5.8 and 5.9).
The impact of risk scenarios vary across different 
sectors
5.33 The impact of the different risk scenarios on 
the level of NPAs in different sectors varied with the 
maximum impact evidenced in the Food Processing, 
Engineering and Iron and Steel sectors. The effect on 
NPAs in agriculture in this macro stress test analysis 
appears to be marginal (Table 5.10).
Table 5.8: Bank-group-wise Projected NPAs
(Multivariate Panel Regression) 
(Per cent of total advances)
Jun-12 Mar-13 Jun-12 Mar-13
Public Sector Banks Old Private Sector Banks
Baseline 3.4 3.5 2.2 2.7
Medium 3.4 3.8 2.2 3.1
Severe 3.4 4.2 2.2 3.5
New Private Sector Banks Foreign Banks
Baseline 2.4 2.7 2.3 3.1
Medium 2.4 3.1 2.3 3.5
Severe 2.4 3.5 2.3 3.9
Source: Supervisory data and RBI Staff calculations
Table 5.10: Projected Sectoral Gross NPA ratio 
(Per cent of total advances)
Sectors March 2013
Baseline
Medium 
Risk
Severe Risk
Agriculture 4.2 4.4 4.5
Food Processing 7.6 8.7 9.9
Construction 2.9 3.1 3.3
Cement 2.9 3.1 3.5
Infrastructure 0.9 1.1 1.3
Iron and Steel 4.2 4.9 5.6
Engineering 4.9 5.6 6.2
Automobiles 2.4 2.6 2.8
Others 3.4 3.7 4.0
Source: Supervisory data and RBI staff calculations
Table 5.9: Bank-group-wise Projected CRAR
(Multivariate Panel Regression)
(Per cent)
Jun-12 Mar-13 Jun-12 Mar-13
Public Sector Banks Old Private Sector Banks
Baseline 12.31 11.58 13.99 12.87
Medium 12.31 11.54 13.99 12.81
Severe 12.31 11.49 13.99 12.75
New Private Sector Banks Foreign Banks
Baseline 16.63 15.12 15.95 14.81
Medium 16.63 15.08 15.95 14.78
Severe 16.63 15.02 15.95 14.74
Source: Supervisory data and RBI staff calculations
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Annex
Methodologies
Financial Stability Map
The Financial Stability Map depicts the overall stability condition in the Indian fi nancial system. The Financial 
Stability Map is based on the three major indicators namely, Macroeconomic Stability Indicator (MSI), Financial 
Market Stability Indicator (FMSI) and Banking Stability Indicator (BSI). The methodologies for calculation of above 
indicators are described below.
Macroeconomic Stability Map and Indicator
The Macroeconomic Stability Map and Indicator is based on seven sub-indices, each pertaining to specifi c area of 
macroeconomic risk. Each sub-index on macroeconomic risk includes select parameters representing risks in that 
area. These sub-indices have been validated by assessing their appropriate impact on macroeconomic or fi nancial 
variable such as GDP, infl ation, interest rates or the quality of assets of the banks. The seven sub-indices of the 
overall macroeconomic stability index and their components are described below:
Global Risk Index
The Global Risk index is based on real output and the prices in the advanced economies. In respect of real output, 
a composite index based on the weighted average of the growth rate of GDP of U.S., Euro Area and Japan has been 
constructed. Using a similar procedure, index for infl ation in these advanced economies was also constructed. 
GDP index is ranked in ascending order while that of infl ation is ranked in descending order. Global Risk Index 
is a composite index of these indices having equal weights for each index.
External Vulnerability
The index of external vulnerability is based on current account defi cit/GDP, current payments/current receipts, 
average monthly imports/reserve, share of short term debt in total debt, debt stock - GDP ratio and debt service ratio.
Fiscal Vulnerability
Initially, an index of fi scal stress is constructed based on the gross primary defi cit (GPD), gross fi scal defi cit (GFD) 
and the total liabilities of the centre and state governments. This is based broadly on the methodology suggested 
in two IMF Working Papers by Baldacci, McHugh and Petrova (2011) and Baldacci, Petrova, Belhocine, Dobrescu 
and Mazraani (2011). The weights in respect of GFD and GPD so obtained were applied to recent data on GPD and 
GFD provided by the Offi ce of the Comptroller General of Accounts to assess the change in fi scal risks.
Growth
For obtaining the outlook on domestic growth, the relationship of growth with a number of variables were 
attempted, viz. exports/GDP, growth of core industry, GFCF/GDP, real bank credit, PMI and yield curve (difference 
between the ten-year and one-year yield). Amongst these variables, the yield curve and PMI Manufacturing were 
found to be the most appropriate indicators of growth.
Infl ation
The outlook for infl ation is based on the changes in international oil prices, exchange rate, and world infl ation.
Corporate Sector
The health of the corporate sector is captured through profi t margin. The risks emanating from the sector is 
inversely related to it. In order to capture the relationship of the corporate sector with the fi nancial sector, the 
share of interest in sales is also captured in the index for the corporate sector.
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Household Sector
In the absence of frequent data on indebtedness of household, the outstanding credit from the bank to the 
household sector, viz. retail credit, is taken as a proxy for household indebtedness. Further, in view of the delay 
in availability of data on personal disposable income, private fi nal consumption expenditure (PFCE) is used as its 
proxy. Based on these two variables, and the retail NPA, the index for household sector attempts to capture the 
risks originating from the household sector.
Financial Markets Stability Map and Indicator
With the objective to measure stability of the fi nancial market, Financial Market Stability Map and Indicator has 
been prepared based on the indicators of four sectors/markets namely banking sector, foreign exchange market, 
equity market and debt market. The indicators selected from various sectors/markets are following; i) Banking 
Sector: Banking Beta of CNXBANK Index and NIFTY Index, CD Rate and CD rate minus Implied Forward rate, ii) 
Foreign Exchange Market: CMAX of daily INR-US Dollar exchange rate, which is defi ned as Xt/Max(Xi, i=1,2,..upto 
one year). Where, Xt is the INR-US Dollar exchange rate at time t, and 25 Delta Risk Reversals of foreign exchange 
rate, iii) Equity Market: Inverse of NIFTY CMAX and India VIX, and iv) Debt Market: Corporate bond which is 
average return of corporate bonds rated A, AA, and AAA, 10-years Government bond yield and CP Rate.
Because of different levels of the selected indicators, they cannot be added straightaway. Therefore, to bring all 
the indicators at same level, variance-equal transformation has been used.
At fi rst level, four indicators for the four selected sectors/market were prepared based on simple average of 
elementary indicators and thereafter FMSI was derived based on simple average of the four indicators derived at 
fi rst level. FMSI was estimated based on daily data.
Further, projection of FMSI was done based on monthly FMSI which is monthly average of daily FMSI, credit 
growth, WPI-Manufactured Products infl ation and REER using following regression equation:
Where, 
Banking Stability Map and Indicator
The Banking Stability Map and Indicator present an overall assessment of changes in underlying conditions and 
risk factors that have a bearing on stability of the banking sector during a period. Following ratios are used for 
construction of each composite index:
Table : Indicators used for construction of Banking Stability Map and Banking Stability Indicator
Dimension Ratios
Soundness CRAR Tier-I Capital to 
Tier-II Capital
Leverage ratio as Total-Assets to Capital and 
Reserves
Asset-Quality Net NPAs to 
Total-Advances
Gross NPAs to Total-
Advances
Sub-Standard-advances 
to gross NPAs
Restructured-Standard-
Advances to Standard-
Advances
Profi tability Return on Assets Net Interest Margin Growth in Profi t
Liquidity Liquid-Assets to 
Total-Assets
Customer-Deposits 
to Total-Assets
Non-Bank-Advances to 
Customer-Deposits
Deposits maturing within-
1-year to Total Deposits
Effi ciency Cost to Income Business (Credit + Deposits) to staff 
expenses
Staff Expenses to Total 
Expenses
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The fi ve composite indices represent the fi ve dimensions viz., Soundness, Asset-quality, Profi tability, Liquidity and 
Effi ciency. Each index, representing a dimension of bank functioning, takes values between zero (minimum) and 
1 (maximum). Each index is a relative measure during the sample period used for its construction, where a high 
value means the risk in that dimension is high. Therefore, an increase in the value of the index in any particular 
dimension indicates an increase in risk in that dimension for that period as compared to other periods. For each 
ratio used for a dimension, a weighted average for the banking sector is derived, where the weights are the ratio 
of individual bank asset to total banking system assets. Each index is normalized for the sample period as ‘Ratio-
on-a-given-date minus Minimum-value-in-sample-period divided by maximum-value-in-sample-period minus 
Minimum-value-in-sample-period’. A composite measure of each dimension is calculated as a weighted average 
of normalised ratios used for that dimension, where the weights are based on the marks assigned for assessment 
for CAMELS rating. Based on the individual composite indices for each dimension, the Banking Stability Indicator 
is constructed as a simple average of these fi ve composite sub-indices.
For the current map and indicator, the sample period for assessment was taken from March 2006 to March 2012. 
Projection of BSI was done using Auto Regressive Moving Average (ARMA) method.
Stress Testing of Derivatives Portfolio of Select Banks
The stress testing exercise focused on the derivatives portfolio of a representative sample set of banks. The top 26 
banks in terms of notional value of derivatives portfolio as at end December 2011 were selected for the analysis. 
The methodology adopted involved designing a set of stress conditions. Each bank in the sample was asked to 
assess the impact of these stress conditions on their respective derivatives portfolios as on March 31, 2012.
In case of domestic banks, the derivatives portfolio of both domestic and overseas operations were reckoned. In 
case of foreign banks, only the domestic (i.e. Indian) position was considered for the exercise. Derivatives trade 
where hedge effectiveness was established was exempted from the tests, while all other trades were included.
The stress scenarios incorporated six historical scenarios and four sensitivity tests. For constructing the historical 
scenario, six parameters (market variables) were chosen and the 1 day rate of change over a horizon of 2007-2011 
was calculated for each variable. The date corresponding to the maximum change (in each variable) was selected 
as the stress period. For each of the six stress periods, the 1 day rate of change for rest of the market variables 
needed for valuation of derivative portfolio of banks was calculated to arrive at six different scenarios
Table : Parameters and Dates used to construct scenario Analysis
Parameter Highest 1 day change in the period 2007-2011
USD/INR Rate of change of -3.1 per cent
MIFOR 6 MONTHS Absolute change of -240 bps
OIS INR 2YEARS Absolute change of -60.5 bps
USD LIBOR 3 MONTHS Absolute change of -38.6 bps
EURIBOR 6 MONTHS Absolute change of 17.5 bps
USD LIBOR SWAP CURVE 5 YEARS Absolute change of -8.5 bps
The sensitivity tests were constructed using the spot USD/INR rate and domestic interest rates as parameters
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Table: Shocks for Sensitivity Analysis
Domestic Interest Rates
Shock 1
Overnight +250 bps
Upto 1yr +150 bps
Above 1yr +100 bps
Domestic Interest Rates
Shock 2
Overnight -250 bps
Upto 1yr -150 bps
Above 1yr -100 bps
Exchange rates
Shock 3 USD/INR +20 per cent
Exchange Rates
Shock 4 USD/INR -20 per cent
Single Factor Sensitivity Analysis – Stress Testing
As a part of quarterly surveillance, stress tests are conducted covering credit risk, interest rate risk, equity price 
risk, foreign exchange risk, liquidity risk etc. Resilience of the commercial banks in response to these shocks is 
studied. The analysis covers all scheduled commercial banks. Single factor sensitivity analysis on credit risk of 
scheduled urban co-operative banks and non-banking fi nancial companies are also conducted.
Credit Risk
To ascertain the resilience of banks, the credit portfolio was shocked by increasing NPA levels, for the entire 
portfolio as well as for select sectors, along with a simultaneous increase in provisioning requirements. For testing 
the credit concentration risk, default of the top individual borrowers and the largest group borrower is assumed. 
The estimated provisioning requirements so derived were adjusted from existing provisions and the residual 
provisioning requirements, if any, were deduced from banks’ capital.
The analysis was carried out both at the aggregate level as well as at the individual bank level, based on supervisory 
data as on March 31, 2012. The scenario assumed enhanced provisioning requirements of 1 per cent, 30 per cent 
and 100 per cent for standard, sub-standard and doubtful/loss advances, respectively. The assumed increase in 
NPAs was distributed across sub-standard, doubtful and loss categories in the same proportion as prevailing in 
the existing stock of NPAs. The additional provisioning requirement was applied to the altered composition of 
the credit portfolio.
Equity price risk, foreign exchange risk and interest rate risk
The fall in value of the portfolio or income losses due to change in equity prices, appreciation/ depreciation of 
INR, shifting of INR yield curve are accounted for the total loss of the banks because of the assumed shock. The 
estimated total losses so derived were reduced from the banks’ capital.
For interest rate risk in the banking Book, two kinds of approaches were considered: (1) Income Approach, which 
impacts the earnings of banks because of shift in INR yield curve and (2) Duration Gap Analysis, which computes 
the valuation impact (portfolio losses). The income losses, on interest bearing exposure gap, are calculated for one 
year for each time bucket separately, to refl ect the impact on the current year profi t & loss and income statement. 
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The portfolio losses, on interest bearing exposure gap, are calculated for each time bucket, using duration gap 
analysis. The total (net) impact on the banking book was calculated by adding income losses/gains and portfolio 
losses/gains[1], and the resultant losses/gains were used to derive the impacted CRAR. The valuation impact for 
the tests was calculated under the assumption that the HTM portfolio would be marked to market. For interest 
rate shocks in trading book, the valuation losses are calculated for each time bucket on the interest bearing assets 
using duration approach.
Liquidity Risk
The aim of liquidity stress tests is to assess the ability of a bank to withstand unexpected liquidity drain without 
taking recourse to any outside liquidity support. The analysis is done as at end-March 2012. The scenario depicts 
different proportions (depending on the type of deposits) of unexpected deposit withdrawals on account of 
sudden loss of depositors’ confi dence and assesses the adequacy of liquid assets available to fund them.
The defi nition of liquid assets are taken as:
1 Cash + Excess CRR + Inter Bank Deposits + SLR Investments
2 Cash + Excess CRR + Inter Bank Deposits maturing-within-1-month + Investments maturing-
within-1-month
3 Cash + Excess CRR + Inter Bank Deposits maturing-within-1-month + Excess SLR Investments
4 Cash + CRR + Inter Bank Deposits maturing-within-1-month + Investments maturing-within-1-
month
5 Cash + CRR + Inter Bank Deposits maturing-within-1-month + Excess SLR Investments
 It is assumed that banks would meet stressed withdrawal of deposits through sale of liquid assets.
 The sale of investments is done with a hair cut of 10 per cent of their market value.
 The stress test is done on a static mode.
Bottom-up Stress Testing
Bottom-up sensitivity analysis was performed by 25 scheduled commercial banks (comprising about 75 percent 
of the total assets). A set of common scenarios and shock sizes were provided to select banks. The tests were 
conducted using March 2012 data. Banks used their own methodologies for calculation of losses in each case.
Urban Co-operative Banks – Credit Risk
Stress tests on credit risk were conducted on Scheduled Urban Co-operative Banks (SUCBs) using their asset 
portfolio as at end-March 2012. The tests were based on single factor sensitivity analysis. The impact on CRAR 
was studied under two different scenarios. The assumed scenarios were as under:
Scenario I:
 Shock applied: 50 per cent increase in gross NPAs.
 Provisioning requirement is increased by 50 per cent.
 Capital (Tier I & II) is reduced by additional provisions.
[1] Total (Net) losses/gain = Income (losses/ gain) + Portfolio (losses/ gain)
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Scenario II:
 Shock applied: 100 per cent increase in gross NPAs.
 Provisioning requirement is increased by 100 per cent.
 Capital (Tier I & II) is reduced by additional provisions.
Liquidity stress test based on cash fl ow basis in 1-28 days time bucket was also conducted, where mismatch 
[negative gap (cash infl ow less than cash outfl ow)] exceeding 20 per cent of outfl ow in 1 to 28 days time bucket 
was considered stressful.
Scenario I: Cash out fl ows in 1-28 days time bucket goes up by 50 per cent (no change in cash infl ows)
Scenario II: Cash out fl ows in 1-28 days time bucket goes up by 100 per cent (no change in cash infl ows)
Non-Banking Financial Companies (ND-SI) – Credit Risk
Stress tests on credit risk were conducted on Non-Banking Financial Companies (Non-Deposit taking and 
Systemically Important) using their asset portfolio as at end-December 2011. The tests were based on single factor 
sensitivity analysis. The impact on CRAR was studied under two different scenarios. The scenario assumed increase 
in the existing stock of NPAs by 200 and 500 per cent. The assumed increase in NPAs was distributed across sub-
standard, doubtful and loss categories in the same proportion as prevailing in the existing stock of NPAs. The 
additional provisioning requirement was adjusted from the current capital position. The stress were conducted 
at individual NBFCs as well as at an aggregate level.
Systemic Liquidity Index (SLI)
The SLI uses the following four indicators representing various segments of the market:
1. Weighted Average Call Rate – RBI Repo Rate
2. 3 month Commercial Paper (CP) Rate – 3 month Certifi cate of Deposits (CD) Rate
3. 3 month CD Rate – 3 month Implied Deposit Rate
4. Weighted Average Call Rate - 3 Month Overnight Index Swap (OIS) Rate
In order to create the SLI, variance-equal or standard normal transformation was used. 
Macro Stress Testing
To ascertain the resilience of banks, the credit risk was modeled as functions of macroeconomic variables. Credit 
risk stress tests have been computed using several econometric models that relate banking system aggregates to 
the macroeconomic variables, such as (i) multivariate logit regression on aggregate systems’ NPA data; (ii) 
multivariate regression in terms of the slippage ratio (infl ow of new NPAs); (iii) aggregate VAR using slippage ratio; 
(iv) quantile regression of slippage ratio, (v) multivariate panel regression on bank-group wise slippage ratio data; 
and (vi) multivariate regressions for aggregate sectoral NPAs. The banking system aggregate includes current and 
lagged values of aggregate NPAs (NPA ratio) and infl ow of new NPAs (slippage ratio), while macroeconomic variables 
include GDP growth, short term interest rate (call rate), WPI infl ation, exports-to-GDP ratio , gross fi scal 
defi cit-to-GDP ratio  and REER.
While the multivariate regressions allows evaluating the impact of selected macroeconomic variables on the 
banking system’s NPA and capital, the VAR model refl ects the impact of the overall economic stress situation on 
the banks’ capital and NPA ratio, which also take into account feed-back effect. In these methods, conditional 
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mean of NPA/slippage ratio is estimated and assumed that the impact of macro variables on credit quality will 
remain same irrespective of the level of the credit quality, which may not always be true. In order to relax this 
assumption, quantile regression has been adapted to project credit quality, in which, in place of conditional mean 
the conditional quantile has been estimated.
The Modeling Framework
The following multivariate models were run to estimate the impact of macroeconomic shocks on the aggregate 
NPA (npa) / slippage ratio (SR): 1
 Aggregate banking system multivariate logit2 regression:
 Where, 
 Aggregate banking system multivariate regression:
The analysis was carried out on slippage ratio at the aggregate level for the commercial banking system as 
a whole.
Where, 
 Vector AutoRegression (VAR):
In order to judge the resilience of banking on various macroeconomic shocks, Vector Autoregressive (VAR)3 
approach has been adopted. The advantage of VAR model is that, it allows to fully capture the interaction 
among macroeconomic variables and banks’ stability variable. It also captures the entailed feedback effect.
In notational form, mean-adjusted VAR of order p (VAR(p)) can be written as
Where,   is a (K×1) vector of variables at time t, the  (i=1,2,…p) are fi xed (K×K) 
coeffi cient matrices and  is a K-dimensional white noise or innovation process.
 In order to estimate, VAR system, slippage ratio, call rate, infl ation, growth and REER were selected, however, 
because of limited data points, GFD-to-GDP could not be taken. The appropriate order of VAR has been 
selected based on minimum information criteria as well as other diagnostics and suitable order was found 
to be two. Accordingly, VAR of order 2 (VAR(2)) was estimated and stability of the model was checked based 
on roots of AR characteristic polynomial. Since, all roots are found to be inside the unit circle, this selected 
model was found to be fulfi lling the stability condition. The impact of various macroeconomic shocks was 
determined using impulse response function of the selected VAR.
1  Slippage ratio, exports/GDP, and the call rate are seasonally adjusted.
2  For detailed model specifi cations, please refer to FSR – December 2010. The logit transformation of NPA ratio is defi ne as:
3  For detailed VAR model specifi cations, please refer to FSR – June 2011.
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 Quantile Regression:
 In order to estimate slippage ratio at desired level of conditional quantile, following quantile regression at 
0.60 quantile (which is the present quantile of the slippage ratio) was used:
 Where, 
 Bank-group wise panel fi xed-effect regression:
 Bank-group wise panel regression was modeled where slippage ratio was considered as functions 
of macroeconomic variables. The bank-group effect were identifi ed along with the overall model 
specifi cations.
 where,  is the bank-group specifi c parameter and .
 Sectoral multivariate regression:
 The impact of macroeconomic shocks on various sectors was assessed by employing multivariate regression 
models using aggregate NPA ratio for each sector separately. The dependent variables consisted of lagged 
NPAs, sectoral GDP growth, infl ation, and short-term interest rate.
Derivation of the NPAs and CRAR from the slippage ratios, which were projected from the above mentioned credit 
risk econometric models, were based on the following assumptions: credit growth of 17 per cent; recovery rate of 
5 per cent; write-offs at 3.5 per cent; risk weighted assets growth of 18 per cent; and profi t growth of 10 per cent. 
The regulatory capital growth is assumed to remain at the minimum by assuming minimum mandated transfer 
of 25 per cent of the profi t to the reserves account. The distribution of new NPAs in various sub-categories was 
done as prevailing in the existing stock of NPAs. Provisioning requirements for various categories of advances are 
0.4 per cent for standard advances, 10 per cent for sub-standard advances, 75 per cent for doubtful advances, and 
100 per cent for loss advances. The projected values of the ratio of the non-performing advances were translated 
into capital ratios using the “balance sheet approach”, by which capital in the balance sheet is affected via the 
provisions and net profi ts. It is assumed that the existing loan loss provisioning coverage ratios remain constant 
for the future impact.
